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Lawyer, Candidate, Beneficiary, AND Judge?
Role Differentiation in Elected Judiciaries
James Samplet

INTRODUCTION
From 2002 to 2009, the United States Supreme Court decided three cases directly bearing on one of the most notable, or
perhaps notorious, examples of American exceptionalism-state
judicial elections.
First, the Court held, 5-4, in Republican Party of Minnesota
v White that a state canon prohibiting judicial candidates from
announcing their views on issues "likely to come before [them]"
failed First Amendment strict-scrutiny analysis. 2 The juxtaposition of the holding in White with the majority's express caveat
that it "neither assert[ed] nor impl[ied] that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as
those for legislative office" 3 continues to spawn challenges to
state judicial canons across the country, with many trial and appellate courts reaching diametrically different results.4 Six years
later, in New York State Board of Elections v Ldpez Torres,5 the
Court upheld New York's uniquely byzantine system of trialcourt elections, emphasizing legislative deference and party associational rights over ballot access and voter and candidate int Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. The author expresses his gratitude to Professors Aziz Huq and Charles Geyh and to the editors of the University of Chicago Legal Forum for helpful comments and suggestions, and to Emily
Grimes, Alex Turbin, and Irene Zoupaniotis for outstanding research assistance. Any
errors, of course, are my own.
1 536 US 765 (2002).
2 Id at 771.
3 Id at 783.
4 See In re Kinsey, 842 S2d 77, 87 (Fla 2003) (denying a judge's constitutional challenge to Canon 7 of Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct because its "pledges and promises
clause" and commit clause were sufficiently narrowly tailored). But see Family 7Tust
FoundationofKentucky v Wonitzek, 345 F Supp 2d 672, 711 (ED Ky 2004) (finding that
Kentucky's canon of judicial conduct prohibiting candidates from making promises,
pledges, or commitments is overly broad and violates the First Amendment).
5 552 US 196 (2008).
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terests. 6 And most recently, in Caperton v A. T Massey Coal Co,
Inc7 the Court found a due process violation where a West Virginia Supreme Court Justice refused to recuse himself from the
appeal of a company whose CEO spent $3 million supporting the
justice's campaign for the bench.8 The Court's decisions occurred
against the backdrop of a decade in which judicial campaign
costs, campaign rhetoric, and tensions surrounding the judicial
role escalated dramatically.
This Article examines the shifting landscape of judicial elections, and the developing dialogue in response to the decisions in
the lower federal courts, state courts, and state legislatures as to
the questions of whether elected judges really are different from
constituent officials, and if so, in what ways the law can-and
cannot-protect and reinforce those differences.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I opens by describing a 2010 sequence involving a judicial candidate's campaign
promise concerning his intended conduct if elected to the judiciary. The sequence is both illustrative of increasingly commonplace dynamics in state judicial elections and, paradoxically, also
singularly bizarre for its comical-though tragically somachinations and explanations.
Part II briefly describes and attempts to harmonize each of
the Supreme Court's state judicial election decisions in the last
decade, with an eye towards discerning a mode for the developing doctrinal balancing as between competing First Amendment,
due process, and structural considerations.
Finally, Part III points to a recent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, written by
Judge Frank Easterbrook, that does a particularly effective job of
reconciling any perceived tension between the Court's holdings in
White and Caperton.9
I. EXHIBIT 2010: KETCHUM vKETCHUM

A recent recusal controversy in West Virginia exemplifies
current tensions in many of America's state courts. The reference
is not to Justice Brent Benjamin's notorious refusal to disqualify
himself from A.T. Massey Coal's appeal after benefiting from $3
million in campaign expenditures from its chief executive of6 Id at 208-209.

7 129 S Ct 2252 (2009).
8 Id at 2257.
9 Bauer v Shepard, 620 F3d 704, 706 (7th Cir 2010).
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ficer.10 Nor is it a reference to Benjamin's former colleague, thenChief Justice Eliot Maynard, who vacationed in the Riviera with
the same Massey CEO while the same Massey appeal was pending, and who then voted, like Benjamin, in Massey's favor, without disclosing the Mediterranean merriment until, much to his
chagrin, photos depicting it made national news." No, compared
to such high-dollar, high-drama affairs, the scenario described
below involving one of Benjamin's newest colleagues, Justice
Menis Ketchum, is mild. Yet, if the extraordinary facts underlying Caperton v Massey took a sledgehammer to ideals of judicial
impartiality, the comparatively tame Ketchum sequence illustrates the erosion, via a thousand cuts, of the same. Regrettably,
such sequences are increasingly de rigueur not only in West Virginia, but in many of the thirty-nine states in which judges are
elected. 12
While campaigning for a seat on West Virginia's Supreme
Court of Appeals in 2008, Ketchum told the West Virginia Record "My judicial philosophy is really quite simple ... I believe it
is the function of judges to even-handedly apply the law rather
than to make the law... . I want to be known as a fair-minded
Justice who puts the law before politics or ideology." 13 During the
same campaign for judicial office, however, Ketchum staked out
a position so categorical as to qualify as a political "gotcha" moment even in a race for legislative or executive office. Addressing
the state's cap on punitive damage awards, Ketchum flatly and
categorically promised: "I will not vote to overturn it, I will not
vote to change it. I will not vote to modify it."14
Predictably, in the fall of 2010, an appeal before the state
high court presented a direct challenge to the constitutionality of
the state Medical Professional Liability Act, which limits puni10

Caperton, 129 S Ct at 2257-58.
I See, for example, Ian Urbina, West Virginia's Top Judge Loses His Re-election Bid,
NY Times A25 (May 15, 2008); Maggie Barron, Impartiality Still an Issue After WV
Judge's Riviera Scandal (Brennan Center for Justice May 15, 2008), online at
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/impartiality-stillanissue aftre-wvjudges
riviera scandal/ (visited Sept 9, 2011).
12 See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States'JudicialSelection, 95 Georgetown
L J 1077, 1094 (2007). See, for example, Catherine Stone and Wendy Martinez, Caperton
v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.: The Texas Implications, 41 St Mary's L J 621, 623-31 (2010)
(discussing several recusal cases in Texas which called into question the propriety of
campaign contributions made by one of the parties to the presiding judge).
13 Chris Dickerson, Ketch um Formally Starts Supreme Court Bid, W Va Rec (Dec 13,
2007).
14 Tony Mauro, New Recusal Controversy in W. Va. High Court, Nat1 L J (Sept 27,
2010), online at http://www.law.conjsp/article.jsp?id=1202472535461 (visited Sept 9,
2011).
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tive damages in malpractice suits to $500,000.15 Unsurprisingly,
the plaintiffs in the action, led by Robert Peck of the Washington,
DC-based Center for Constitutional Litigation, sought Justice
Ketchum's recusal on the ground that Ketchum's campaign
statements "indicate[d] clear prejudgment of this case," 16 thus
violating the state code of judicial conduct, which prohibits candidates from making "pledges or promises of conduct in office"
and making statements that "commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are
likely to come before the court."17
Justice Ketchum denied the recusal motion, asserting that
"those statements reflect my views as Lawyer Ketchum-not jurist Ketchum. . . . [A]s a jurist I am required to look at all issues
from a different perspective than I enjoyed as Lawyer Ketchum."18

"Lawyer Ketchum" was also, of course, candidate for State
Supreme Court Justice Ketchum. For that matter, even Lawyer
Ketchum's statement expressly refers three times to how he
would "vote"-a luxury not afforded to lawyers qua lawyers on
such matters-if elected to the state high court. To promise specific conduct, in reference to a specific law, even to the point of
categorically ruling out the possibility of minor "change" or "modif[ication]" while in pursuit of votes for judicial office, and then,
having obtained the office, to turn around and claim that the
statements reflect only the persona of Lawyer Ketchum not only
reflects a serious lack of understanding of the judicial canons,
but is also patently duplicitous.
Ketchum's nonrecusal came via an order released only to the
parties in the case.19 After learning of the nonrecusal, Peck correctly told the NationalLaw Journal's Tony Mauro that there
was no procedural mechanism to appeal Ketchum's refusal despite his clear contravention of the judicial code. In West Virginia, and in most state supreme courts in the United States, 20 the
15 Id.
16 Id.

17 W Va Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)-(ii).
18 Memorandum from Justice Menis E. Ketchum to Rory L. Perry, II, Clerk, and the
Other Justices, MacDonald v City Hospital,No 35543 (Sept 23, 2010) (on file with author).
19 Tony Mauro, W Va. Justice Reverses Self Recuses in Malpractice Case, Natl L J
(Sept 29, 2010), online at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202472652410 (visited
Sept 6, 2011) (quoting Ketchum's later statement that the order "was sent only to the
lawyers in the case").
20 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? GivingAdequate Atten-
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most that a litigant or lawyer in Peck's situation can presently
hope for is a long-after-the-fact disciplinary reprimand of the
judge that proves of little consequence to the jurist, provides little solace to the litigant, and does little, if anything, to restore
public confidence in the courts.
If the fact pattern involving Lawyer Ketchum, setting creative semantics aside, seemed illustrative of dynamics increasingly common in judicial elections, the events a mere ninety-six
hours later, proved truly remarkable-even frightening. Four
days after Ketchum's initial order, it became clear that it was not
at all accidental that the order was released only to the lawyers
in the case.
The following Monday, Justice Ketchum issued a second order, the opening sentence of which stated, "Upon further reflection, I am disqualifying myself from the above case." 21 Did the
canons of conduct suddenly reign? Far from it. Justice Ketchum
reasserted: "I strongly believe there is absolutely no legal basis
for my disqualification." 22 Instead, Justice Ketchum asserted,
"[I]t appears to me that the lawyers who moved to disqualify me
are attempting to create a 'firestorm' by assaulting the integrity
and impartiality of West Virginia's Supreme Court." 23 The basis
for that assertion is as tenuous as the distinction between Lawyer and Jurist Ketchum itself. Justice Ketchum continued, "I
promptly sent my disqualification response to the lawyers on
September 23, 2010. The next day my response appeared in a
Washington internet blog. (See copy attached). How did a blog so
quickly get my disqualification memorandum which was sent
only to the lawyers in the case?" 24 Picking up on his earlier Lawyer Ketchum fiction, Ketchum further asked, rhetorically: "Why

tion to Failingsof JudicialImpartiality,47 San Diego L Rev 1, 64 (2010). Prompted by
Caperton v Massey, the Michigan Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision adopted new recusal
rules requiring that a judge facing a petition for voluntary recusal provide a written opinion explaining his or her decision. Under these new-and certainly improved from Michigan's previous standard, which lacked the American Bar Association's general disqualification clause adopted by forty-seven other states-rules, if the judge refuses to recuse
himself or herself, the challenger may petition the court en banc for a decision. Ed Brayton, Mich. Supreme Court Adopts New Recusal Rules, Mich Messenger (Dec 1, 2009).
21 Memorandum from Justice Menis E. Ketchum to Rory L. Perry, II, Clerk, and the
Other Justices, MacDonald v City Hospital, No 35543 (Sept 27, 2010), online at
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/6504817/Ketchum%20recusal%20ordere/2C%20statement%2C%2
Oand%20blog%20post.pdf (visited Sept 6, 2011) ("Ketchum Sept 27 Memo" hereinafter).
22 Id.
23 Id.

24 Id (parenthetical and italics in original).

284

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2011:

is it news worthy that a West Virginia judge previously exercised
his right of Freedom of Speech?" 25
The answer to the first of Ketchum's rhetorical questions is,
of course, exactly what he implies: the lawyers in the case, quite
logically, shared the order with Mauro. 26 What is shocking is
that, apparently, Ketchum thinks it inappropriate for them to
have done so. Indeed, given his own italicized statement that he
sent the initial order "only to the lawyers in the case," 27 making
the order public was precisely what Ketchum intended to avoid.
Ketchum's statement, and particularly the italics, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of a judge in a public
court system. The matter was not a dispute before a private arbitrator bound by confidentiality, but rather involved an order
from a justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
in a case involving a challenge to a state law. Moreover, the motion raised a serious and legitimate question as to whether an
officer of that court should have disqualified himself from the
appeal based on the (equally public) state canons of judicial conduct. Providing transparency in such circumstances is among the
highest and most time-honored traditions of the free preSS28 -a
wrinkle that is perhaps ironic given Ketchum's singular emphasis on his own First Amendment speech rights. 29
Beyond the almost tragicomic qualities of the initial and
subsequent written orders, Ketchum's bungling of the merits of
the recusal motion reflects not only a deeply troubling misunderstanding of disqualification standards, but also a striking lack of
savvy as to judicial independence in general. In addition to the
tortured reasoning of the Lawyer Ketchum-Jurist Ketchum dichotomy, Ketchum's reading of White was objectively erroneous,
no matter one's normative view on the White decision itself.
White is a decision that struck down an ex ante prohibition on

25 Ketchum Sept 27 Memo (cited in note 21).
26 As yet further indication of Justice Ketchum's pattern of using semantics as sword,
it bears noting that Mauro is hardly a mere "Washington internet blog[gerl" but is, rather, among the deans of legal journalism.
27 Ketchum Sept 27 Memo (cited in note 21).
28 See Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697, 719-20 (1931) (warning that the press is a
necessary means of protecting against the corruption of government officials and against
the upheaval of our constitutional democracy). See also Mark Fenster, The Opacity of
Thansparency,91 Iowa L Rev 885, 895 (2006) (noting that 'open government is an essential element of a functional liberal democracy").
29 See Ketchum Sept 27 Memo (cited in note 21) ("The blog did not have the decency
to publish my First Amendment rationale as authorized by Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White, or quote the legal rationale from White set out in my memorandum.").

279]

ROLE DIFFERENTIATIONIN ELECTED JUDICIARIES

285

judicial candidates announcing their views,30 which not only
failed to expressly reach highly specific pledges or promises with
respect to conduct in office, but also expressly noted the availability of recusal as an ex post remedy in lieu of the ex ante prohibition.3 1 Moreover, Justice Ketchum's invocation of White not
only failed to account for the differences inhering in the ex post
remedy of recusal, but reflected what can only be described as
either a failure to actually read White, or a failure to understand
even its most direct passages, chief among them, the majority's
statement that:
[w]e know that "announc[ing] ...

views" on an issue co-

vers much more than promisingto decide an issue a particular way. The prohibition extends to the candidate's
mere statement of his current position, even if he does not
bind himself to maintain that position after election. All
the parties agree this is the case, because the Minnesota
Code contains a so-called "pledges or promises" clause,
which separatelyprohibits judicial candidates from making "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office,"-a prohibition that is not challenged here and on
which we express no view. 32
Second, when a state supreme court jurist declines to disqualify based on the applicable canon of the judicial code, but
then decides to disqualify, expressly citing the creation of a "firestorm" over the decision-even including as an attachment with
his order the one news story-the sequence inverts the most
basic norms of an independent judiciary. Ketchum's "firestorm,"
referring to one story in one outlet-notably, a news story that
didn't even editorialize but merely (1) reported the plaintiffs' arguments; (2) reported and quoted from Justice Ketchum's decision declining to disqualify; and (3) reported an academic's evaluative comment 33-makes one question whether it is premature
to conclude that judicial independence is not only dead but in
need of a better mortician.

30 See White, 536 US at 788.

31 Id at 794 (Kennedy concurring).
32 Id at 770 (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original).
33 Mauro, New Recusal Controversy,Nat1 L J (cited in note 14). While the academic
quoted was, in fact, your author, one certainly need not be an expert in recusal to have
detected and been troubled by the sequence.
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While the correct result of disqualification was ultimately
reached, the dynamics created by the wrong rationale are patently perverse. If one news story in a legal trade publication is a
"firestorm," imagine the persuasive power of more sustained criticisms-not to mention the new incentives to generate such critiques. Further, the transparent, even italicized, acknowledgment by Ketchum that he intended his decision on the matter
"only" for the parties in the case reflects a fundamental misapprehension of the public judicial role as distinct from, for example, a private arbitrator. 3 4
Clearly, Justice Ketchum's story represents merely one particularly colorful example of the changing nature of the judicial
role in states with elected judiciaries. Ex ante, Ketchum's repeated and categorical campaign promises with respect to capping punitive damages in malpractice suits, even to the point of
ruling out slight modification, were inconsistent with the judicial
role-regardless of selection mode. Ex post, Justice Ketchum's
analysis in the initial order denying disqualification was, at best,
misleading with respect to the relationship between "Lawyer
Ketchum" and "Jurist Ketchum" as well as a confused misapplication of White's holding. Finally, the postscript, in which
Ketchum ultimately reached the correct decision on recusal despite his expressly reactionary reasoning, was solely based on his
reaction to the slightest of public critiques. 35 That Justice Ketchum expressly cited as the basis of his disqualification the "firestorm" created by the report reflects devolution in the norms of
an independent judiciary and chilling precedent for further devolution yet to come. This Article asserts, more broadly, that the
Ketchum incident illustrates not only confusion, but increasingly
polarized perspectives within judiciaries themselves as to the
canons of judicial conduct, the rules of disqualification, and the
strained relationship between campaigns for the courts and the
judicial role once seated on the bench.

34 Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency,94 Iowa L Rev 481, 494-514, 535
(2009) (describing the benefits of transparency in public adjudication, including the exposure of impropriety and enhancing general knowledge, as contrasted with the essentially
confidential nature of private arbitration results and proceedings).
3 See generally Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521, 529 (Wesleyan
1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) (warning that if there were judicial elections "there would be
too great a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be
consulted but the constitution and the laws").
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II. COURTS IN COURT: WHITE, LOPEZ TORRES, AND CAPERTON
A.

Republican Partyof Minnesota v White

The first of the Supreme Court's three forays into state judicial elections during the opening decade of the 2000s involved a
provision of Minnesota's code of judicial conduct known as the
"announce clause," which prohibited candidates for judicial office
from announcing their positions on disputed political or legal
questions. 36 The Court emphasized states' ex ante option to
choose appointments rather than elections and held that,
[although states can choose whether to elect judges or appoint them,] the greater power to dispense with elections
altogether does not include the lesser power to conduct
elections under conditions of state imposed voter ignorance. If the State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process, it must accord
the participants in that process ... the First Amendment

rights that attach to their roles. 37
Reduced to its essence, the White majority reasoned that if a
state chooses to elect judges then the announce clause comes at a
severe informational cost to voters. However, this reasoning inadequately addressed the simple fact that state judicial elections
are the norm rather than the exception, as thirty-nine states
elect some or all of their judges. 38 Minnesota's announce clause
prohibition was one part of the state's overall code of judicial
conduct. Such codes, in place in each of the thirty-nine elective
states as well as in states without judicial elections, are generally "modeled after Canon 5 of the American Bar Association's
(ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and adopted in some form
in virtually every state," 39 and the codes "have long served as one
6 White, 536 US at 770.
3 Id at 788.
38 See Schotland, 95 Georgetown L J at 1092 (cited in note 12).
39 Wendy W. Weiser, RegulatingJudges'PoliticalActivity After White, 68 Albany L
Rev 651, 651 (2005). See also id at 651 n 2 (noting the ABA announcement to develop
revisions to the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct). The revised ABA Model Codes
were unanimously approved by the House of Delegates on February 12, 2007. See American Judicature Society, Evaluation of the Model Code, online at http://www.ajs.org/ethics
ethABA_commission.asp (visited Sept 6, 2011). For example, having taken effect on
January 1, 2009, the canons were replaced with rules of judicial conduct by the Indiana
Supreme Court. See Cynthia Gray, Developments Following Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 US. 765 (2002), online at http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/Develop
mentsafterWhite.pdf (visited Sept 6, 2011).
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of the primary means by which states seek to ensure the distinct
characters and constitutional roles of their judicial branches." 40
The codes reflect an effort aptly described as "attempt[ing] to
find that magic line in the sand-the precise point at which public accountability does not inherently violate the independence
and impartiality that is essential to the judicial function." 41 Neither finding nor concluding that "magic line in the sand" is "an
easy task."42
Minnesota proffered two interests in justifying the announce
clause: (1) "preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary" via
the "protect[ion] of the due process rights of litigants";43 and (2)
"preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary" via the
"preserv[ation] of public confidence in the judiciary."44 Perhaps
the most doctrinally thorough portion of the White decision is its
discussion of the different ways in which impartiality may be
defined. The majority recognized three potential definitions of
judicial "impartiality": (1) "lack of bias for or against either party
to [a] proceeding;" 45 (2) "lack of preconception in favor of or
against a particular legal view;" 46 and (3) "open-mindedness," by
which the majority meant not lack of preconceptions, "but that
[the judge] be willing to consider views that oppose [the judge's]
preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues
arise in a pending case."47
The majority acknowledged the compelling interest in the
first of the three types of impartiality (bias for or against a party); hedged as to the third; and rejected the second. 48 The majority, applying strict-scrutiny analysis, found that the announce
40 Weiser, 68 Albany L Rev at 651 (cited in note 39).
41 Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake ofWhite: How States Are Responding to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How JudicialElections Are Changing,38 Akron L Rev 625, 629 (2005).
42 Id.

43
44

White, 536 US at 775.
Id.

45 Id (emphasis omitted).
46 Id at 777 (emphasis omitted).

47

White, 536 US at 777-78.

48 Id at 777-78, 781. With respect to the majority's framing of the second interest,
Charlie Geyh's colorful description is that the majority 'beats the stuffing out of a straw
man, when it rejects the silly notion that impartiality requires judges to have a total 'lack
of preconception' on particular legal views." Charles Gardner Geyh, Why JudicialElections Stink, 64 Ohio St L J 43, 65 (2003). Geyh notes there is "a clear difference between
the judge who harbors preconceptions on issues of law, which is both inevitable and desirable, and the judge who has publicly etched his position on such issues in stone before
the case is heard-which is the problem that the announce clause was designed to address." Id at 65-66.
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clause was not narrowly tailored to serve either the first or third
interest. 49 In the case of the first, the Court indicated that it
"guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will apply
the law to him in the same way he applies it to any other party."50 Since the announce clause precluded judicial candidates
from addressing issues rather than parties, the majority reasoned that it worked a substantial deprivation of the very type of
information of value to voters while failing to serve the interest
in protecting against party-based bias. 51 In the case of the third,
even assuming, arguendo, that the state had a compelling interest in open-mindedness, the Court likewise found that the announce clause was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest,
given the range of other mediums through which judges could
express opinions. 52
As J.J. Gass ably articulates, "bias against a particular party and bias on particular legal issues are not as clearly distinct
as the White opinion makes it seem." 53 Gass uses the example of
a "woman in a custody battle standing before a judge who declared in his election campaign that 'men get too many raw deals
in custody rulings,'" and who, in Gass's terms, "cannot be comforted by the thought that this is merely a bias 'on an issue.'" 5 4
Still, the majority's definitions are helpful in moving beyond the
malleable generic term "impartiality" alone. Indeed, when read
in combination, the definitions offer particular support for what I
will term "interest 1.5," the midpoint between interest one and
interest two: the interest in preventing bias for or against certain
classes of litigants.5 5 Like Gass, legal ethics scholar Charlie
49 White, 536 US at 776, 781.
50 Id at 776.
51 Id.

52 Consider id at 780 ("As a means of pursuing the objective of open-mindedness that
respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.").
5 J.J. Gass, After White: Defending and Amending Canons of Judicial Ethics 6
(Brennan Center for Justice 2004), online at http://brennan.3cdn.net/0b74af850b81d92
928_bvm6y5sdf.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011) (em dash omitted).
5

Id at 6-7.

5 My former colleague Wendy Weiser deserves credit for seizing on this point shortly
after White. See Weiser, 68 Albany L Rev at 659 & n 40 (cited in note 39). See also In re
Watson, 794 NE2d 1, 3, 8 (NY 2003) (per curiam) (upholding "New York's pledges or
promises clause" as applied to statement by a judge suggesting that he will favor prosecutors); In re Kinsey, 842 S2d at 87 (per curiam) (same with respect to Florida canon). But
see Mississippi Commission on JudicialPerformance v Wilkerson, 876 S2d 1006, 1015
(Miss 2004) (rejecting application of canon to judge's insulting public statements about
gays on the grounds that there is "no compelling state interest in requiring a partial
judge to keep quiet about his prejudice so that he or she will appear impartial").
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Geyh, whose overall view of Whitds taxonomy is that "[a]part
from being unnecessary, the Court's trifurcated analysis of impartiality is patently fallacious,"5 6 is particularly cognizant that
interest 1.5 is actually more likely to be meaningful than interest
one itself. As Geyh notes:
As to the first definition, whenever a judicial candidate
takes a categorical position on an issue that concerns a
class of would-be parties (be it gays, fundamentalist
Christians, women, environmentalists, white collar defendants, immigrants), that position can reflect, or be perceived as reflecting, the candidate's underlying biases visa-vis members of that class. Indeed, judicial candidates on
the stump will rarely, if ever, have occasion to make
statements that exhibit bias toward particular parties independent of the issues those parties are likely to litigate.5 7
White was, by its own terms, a narrow decision. Justice Scalia's majority opinion expressly stated that "we neither assert nor
imply that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial
office to sound the same as those for legislative office."5 8 But in
White's wake, "state regulatory systems designed to promote the
independence and impartiality of their judiciaries [were] thrown
into disarray."5 9 In part, the disarray resulted from the combination of the "neither assert nor imply" caveat, mixed with the fact
that "the Court also pointedly declined to find that the First
Amendment allows greater regulation of judicial election campaigns than of other elections." 60 Reflecting on those mixed signals, one scholar wrote that "[wihether the White result is correct, its reasoning, which fails to lay out a framework balancing
the constitutional values served by the canons with those of free
speech in the special context of judicial elections, is unsatisfying."61
56 Geyh, 64 Ohio St L J at 65 (cited in note 48).

57 Id.
58 White, 536 US at 783. Indeed, Tom Phillips recently wrote, "In and of itself,
[White] was hardly a remarkable decision, as it affected only one obsolete provision that
seemed patently overbroad." Thomas R. Phillips and Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for
Judges and FairAppeals for Litigants JudicialRecusal in a Post-White World, 55 Drake
L Rev 691, 698 (2007).
59 Weiser, 68 Albany L Rev at 651 (cited in note 39).
60 Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes After Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White, 153 U Pa L Rev 181, 182 (2004).
61 Weiser, 68 Albany L Rev at 653 (cited in note 39).
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Beyond the mere "unsatisfying" doctrinal aspects of the decision alluded to in the comments above, however, more pragmatically, the lack of a framework "exacts a considerable cost":6 2 as
state courts, legislatures, and bar associations engage in postWhite reconsiderations of their judicial codes, they are left to do
so without "adequate direction from the Supreme Court for these
considerable tasks."63 As of the White decision in 2002, "only
eight states had some version of the Announce Clause (which
was part of the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct)," 64
but the Court's holding and the ambiguities in its reasoning rendered "other restrictions on campaign speech . .. ripe targets" for

litigation challenges. 65 It took little time for challenges to state
rules involving judicial campaign pledges or promises,66 solicitation clauses, 67 prohibitions on false or misleading statements, 68
recusal provisions,6 9 and clauses restricting partisan activities7 0
to proliferate.7 1
1. The endurance of the White concurrences.
a) Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy each concurred in White. 72 With the benefit of nearly a decade's hindsight, it is clear that, for very different reasons, their
respective concurrences remain touchstones in the field of judicial selection. Justice O'Connor joined the majority opinion but
62

63 Id.
64 Gass, Defending and Amending Canons of JudicialEthics at 7 (cited in note 53).

One reason that so few states had announce clauses at the time of White was that the
announce clause had been removed from the ABA's 1990 Model Code. See White, 536 US
at 773 n 5.
65 Gass, Defending and Amending Canons of JudicialEthics at 2 (cited in note 53).
See also Weiser, 68 Albany L Rev at 653 n 10 (cited in note 39) (summarizing early challenges).
66 See, for example, Ackerson v Kentucky JudicialRetirement & Removal Commission, 776 F Supp 309, 313-14 (WD Ky 1991) ("The canon . .. prohibits, in broad language,
pledges and promises of conduct in office and commitments with respect to issues likely to
come before the court."). See also ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.10(B)
(2007) ("Model Code" hereinafter).
6 See Model Code Rule 3.7(A)(2)-(3). See, for example, Ackerson, 776 F Supp at 31314; Weaver vBonner, 309 F3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir 2002).
68 See Model Code Rule 4.1(A)(11). See, for example, Ackerson, 776 F Supp at 313-14.
69 See Model Code Rule 2.11. See, for example, Ackerson, 776 F Supp at 313-14.
7o See Model Code Rule 4.2 (2007). See, for example, Ackerson, 776 F Supp at 313-14;
Siefert v Alexander, 608 F3d 974, 977 (7th Cir 2010).
71 See Weiser, 68 Albany L Rev at 653 n 10 (cited in note 39) (summarizing early
challenges). See also David E. Pozen, The Irony of JudicialElections, 108 Colum L Rev
265, 297-98 (2008) (surveying challenges to the canons).
72 White, 536 US at 788 (O'Connor concurring); id at 792 (Kennedy concurring).
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wrote "separately to express [her] concerns about judicial elections generally." 73 Justice O'Connor's concurrence was, to say the
least, pointed:
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested popular elections instead of through an appointment system . . . In doing so the State has voluntarily
taken on the risks to judicial bias ... As a result, the

State's claim that it needs to significantly restrict judges'
speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is particularly troubling. If the State has a problem with judicial
impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself
by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges.7 4
Justice O'Connor, it is now widely acknowledged, came to
regret her role as the fifth vote in White. 5 To her enduring credit, Justice O'Connor's retirement from the Court has been
marked by anything but a retirement from the discourse on matters of judicial selection. 76 Justice O'Connor remains an ardent
critic of judicial elections and an ardent supporter of commissionbased appointment processes.77 Her advocacy, which has included extensive time working on court reform with her colleagues on
elected state benches, as well as with court reform advocates, has
also led her to embrace judicial-election reform measures that
stop well short of appointment systems-a significant tempering
of the it's-the-state's-fault-for-choosing-the-system-in-the-firstplace spirit of her White concurrence.78 As just one example of
7 Id at 788 (O'Connor concurring).
7 Id at 792.
7 See Matthew Hirsch, Swing Voter's Lament: At Least One Case Still Bugs
O'Connor,Legal Intelligencer (Nov 8, 2006), online at http: //www.law.com/jsp/law/Law
ArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1162893919695 (visited Sept 6, 2011) (quoting Justice O'Connor as
saying that White "does give me pause").
76 See Joan Biskupic, O'Connor Retired from Court, Not Discourse, USA Today 2A
(Sept 9, 2010).
7 See Sandra Day O'Connor, Take Justice Off the Ballot, NY Times WK9 (May 22,
2010), online at http://www.nytimes.conV2010/05/23/opinior/23oconnor.htmi (visited Sept
6, 2011).
7 See id. It bears mentioning here that I am an agnostic on what one scholar aptly
terms "The Endless Judicial Selection Debate." See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless
JudicialSelection Debate and Why It Matters for JudicialIndependence, 21 Georgetown
J Legal Ethics 1259, 1279 (2008) (noting that changing election systems "can be a worthy
goal and one well worth pursuing . .. but not at the expense of ignoring shorter-term
remedies that can make a bad system better in the interim"). My colleague Monroe
Freedman, who, among his many achievements, has received the American Bar Association's highest award for professionalism in recognition of his scholarship in legal ethics,
asserts, more aggressively, that "[t]here is substantial reason to believe that elected judg-
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this subtle but significant change, Justice O'Connor recently
drafted the foreword to a report detailing the transformation of
judicial elections in the first decade of the 2000s, 7 9 and, in addition to advocating appointment systems, noted that "[o]ther
promising state initiatives have included public financing of judicial elections, campaign disclosure laws, and recusal reforms."80
b) Justice Kennedy. If Justice O'Connor's concurrence
occasioned regret and an energetic and deeply personal commitment to promoting impartial state courts, Justice Kennedy's concurrence provided, though few recognized it at the time, a limiting principle and a dose of foreshadowing. According to Justice
Kennedy, strict-scrutiny analysis was unnecessary in that "[t]he
speech at issue" was not "within any of the exceptions to the
First Amendment."8 1 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy asserted that the state interest in maintaining the integrity of its judiciary is an interest of "vital importance" 82 and, most notably, that
states "may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires." 83 One curiosity of Justice Kennedy's endorsement
of "adopt[ing]" recusal rules "more rigorous than due process requires" is that such rules existed at the time of White, and still
exist, in all fifty states. 84 The most general, both in its terms and
es are influenced in controversial cases by the threat of being voted out of office ... [and
thus] there is a strong argument that a decision by such a judge violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Monroe H. Freedman and Abbe Smith, UnderstandingLawyers'Ethics § 8.10, 248-50 (4th ed 2010). Ultimately, probably the primary
force behind my own agnosticism is pragmatism. Indeed, my own approach could scarcely
be articulated more effectively than via the words through which Roy Schotland articulates his. See Roy A. Schotland, A Plea for Reality, 74 Mo L R 507, 508 (2009) ("I have
adhered to agnosticism about methods of selection. One reason is this: My writing and
work aim at making a difference, but to say anything new on this subject seems almost
impossible, and for the last generation the battles to change selection methods have been
futile.").
7 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword,in James Sample, et al, The New Politics
of JudicialElections, 2000-09: Decade of Change (Charles Hall ed) (Justice at Stake
Campaign 2010), online at http;/justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNPJEDecadeONLINE
EC9663F6F7865.pdf (visited Sept 6, 2011) ("New Politics 2010" hereinafter). In addition
to being grateful to Justice O'Connor for her foreword to the report, this author is forever
indebted to her for the privilege of having appeared as an undercard speaker at several of
the dozens of events across the country in which Justice O'Connor has tirelessly and
devotedly appeared advocating for her twin priorities of civics education and merit selection of judges.
s0 Id.
81 White, 536 US at 793.
82 Id at 793.
83 Id at 794.

84 James Sample, David Pozen, and Michael Young, Fair Courts: Setting Recusal
Standards17 (Brennan Center for Justice 2008), online at http://brennan.3cdn.net/
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in its near-universal adoption with only minor variation, is Rule
2.11(A) of the ABA's 2007 Model Code (formerly Canon 3E(1)): "A
judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."8 5
Given the ubiquity of such standards, one might expect that
Justice Kennedy's "more rigorous" statement would be considered neither particularly complicated, nor particularly controversial. But one would be wrong-in part because recusal rules are
so widely misunderstood, and in part because of organized efforts
to undermine them. Most notably, James Bopp, who successfully
argued White before the Supreme Court, has subsequently developed a cottage industry challenging other canons of judicial
conduct in states across the country.8 6 The following exchange
from an ABA Journalcover profile of Bopp reflects both the misunderstandings and the clear efforts to seize on those misunderstandings: "In fact, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, in his concurrence in the White case, wrote that states 'may adopt recusal
rules more rigorous than due process requires and censure judges who violate these standards.' Bopp says if that happens, he
will sue over the disqualification standards."8 7
Suits or no suits, Bopp obfuscates the fact that there is no
"if" applicable to Justice Kennedy's statement: rules such as the
"might reasonably be questioned" standard have long been in
place, despite the fact that, while clearly having due process
norms at their foundation, they are indisputably broader than
constitutional due process requires. On the other hand, Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in the White judgment, when read in
combination with the "more rigorous" statement, reflected an
inherent and underlying predicate-namely that, in the context
of judicial elections, First Amendment interests are not talismanic and must be balanced against due process. The concurrence
further suggests that recusal might be constitutionally mandated
in certain instances and that mandatory-recusal regimes might
be constitutionally permitted in a broader range of circumstances.
lafc0474a5a53df4d0_7tm6brjhd.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011) ("Setting Recusal Standards"
hereinafter) (noting that forty-seven states have adopted some version of ABA Model
Code Rule 2.11(A), and the remaining three that have not may incorporate the rule
through other means).
85 Id (noting the near universality of the basic disqualification standard).
86 Terry Carter, The Big Bopper, 92 ABA J 31, 34 (Nov 2006) (noting that "if Bopp
wins these cases [challenging state canons] . . . he often collects fees from the other side,"
including his "biggest payday" yet in the White case: $867,000).
87 Id (emphasis added).
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After White, luminaries among Justice Kennedy's state colleagues, such as former Texas Chief Justice Tom Phillips, would
specifically cite Justice Kennedy's statement for the proposition
that "'more rigorous' recusal standards are the proper response
to concerns that unfettered judicial speech may undermine the
real and perceived fairness of the courts,"8 8 and, further, that
"now, as never before, reinvigorating recusal is truly necessary to
preserve the court system that Chief Justice Rehnquist called
the 'crown jewel' of our American experiment."8 9 Phillips even
speculates that it is "[p]erhaps because of Justice Kennedy's concurrence" that "no challenge to the disqualification or recusal
provisions of a state code, rule, or statute has yet succeeded."90
2.

After White.

The post- White "disarray" also reflects competing political
agendas:
No doubt some who continue to defend traditional interpretations of all the canons are unrealistically optimistic
about the limits of the decision in White or simply disagree with it. Other groups, however, have just as clearly
exaggerated the effect of the holdings and argued . . . that

almost all restrictions on the political activity of all judges
should be eliminated-not just the restrictions on campaign activity ... That argument goes far beyond the actual holdings, and such an expansive reading is an unjustified abandonment of the state courts' efforts to promote
judicial integrity, impartiality, and independence.9 1
These diametrically opposed perspectives on whether a
state's decision to elect, or not elect, its judges is the equivalent
of an all-or-nothing, on-off proposition, and results from the overstated spin spawned by those perspectives. 92
88 Honorable Thomas R. Phillips, Foreword,in Sample, et al, Setting Recusal Standards 3 (cited in note 84).
89 Id.
90 Phillips and Poll, 55 Drake L Rev at 700 (cited in note 58). See also Cynthia Gray,
Case-Law Following Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 93 Judicature 26 (2010).
But see Duwe v Alexander, 490 F Supp 2d 968, 977 (WD Wis 2007) (finding that the rule
requiring judges to recuse themselves for appearing to commit to a particular position
violated the First Amendment on its face).
91 Cynthia Gray, Viewpoint: The Limits of White, 89 Judicature 315, 315 (2006).
92 The topic of how to interpret White is far from alone in this respect, even within
the subject area of judicial selection. As one commentator notes, the topic of judicial selection generally "suffers from much myth and much spin. Myth matters when it differs
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Writing in the immediate aftermath of White, Roy Schotland
predicted that the decision would "downgrade the pool of candidates for the bench, reduce the willingness of good judges to seek
reelection, add to the cynical view that judges are merely 'another group of politicians,' and thus directly hurt state courts and
indirectly hurt all our courts."9 3 Whether such predictions proved
accurate or not is impossible to determine. For his part, Schotland's more recent assessments reflect some tempering. In 2009,
in the final law review article of a scholarly career, much of
which entailed trailblazing in the study of state courts, Schotland asserted that "[iun fact, as important as White has been, so
far it has had little impact on campaigns, but that will change as
traditional norms are eroded by envelope-stretching candidates."94
My own view is a bit closer to Schotland's initial assessment.
In a 2006 amicus brief 9 in support of an unsuccessful cert petition in a notorious, pre-Caperton case arising out of a fundraising-record-breaking judicial election in Illinois, 96 I argued that
when canons are stricken, "[g]iven the dynamics of modern political contests, the vacuum formerly occupied by the canon is almost invariably filled by a race to the bottom with respect to the
conduct at issue,"97 and that under such circumstances "judicial
candidates refrain from once-prohibited conduct only at their
peril. Without effective canons, the candidates face a prisoner's
dilemma: either they comport themselves in a manner that may
be inconsistent with impartiality or risk almost certain defeat."9 8
from reality about where we are and how we got here. Spin matters because it interferes
with honest dialog about where we are and what, if any, change is needed." Schotland, 74
Mo L Rev at 507-08 (cited in note 78) (emphasis omitted).
93 Roy A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians, 39 J Am Judges Assn
1, 8 (2002).
9 Schotland, 74 Mo L Rev at 519 n 34 (cited in note 78).
9 Brief Amicus Curiae of 12 Organizations Concerned about the Influence of Money
on Judicial Integrity, Impartiality, and Independence in Support of Petitioners, Avery v
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co, Civil Action No 05-842 (Ill filed Feb 3 2006)
(available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 295175) ("Judicial Integrity Brief"). The brief, jointly
authored with colleagues at the Brennan Center and Campaign Legal Center, was submitted on behalf of a dozen national non-profit and good government groups in support of
the Petitioners.
96 See generally Avery v State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co, 835 NE2d 801 (Ill
2005). The facts in Avery are not for the faint of heart. See generally James Sample, The
Campaign Trial, Slate (Mar 6, 2006), online at http//www.slate.conid/2137529/ (visited
Sept 6, 2011).
9 Judicial Integrity Brief at *18 (cited in note 95).
98 Id. Although a more fulsome discussion of this particular point is beyond the scope
of the present Article, it bears noting briefly that, on a purely anecdotal level, the highestprofile state supreme court elections of 2010-retention elections in Iowa and Illinois-
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One challenge of estimating Whitds impact is the impossibility of isolating it as a factor apart from other trends in judicial
elections over the prior decade.9 9 There are, however, certain statistical anomalies that are so pronounced, and so close in time to
White itself, that it is difficult to conclude that White was not at
least a significant factor. Perhaps the most notable of these is the
jump in television advertising in contested elections for seats on
state supreme courts. In the year 2000-that is, in the election
cycle prior to the Supreme Court's decision in White-just 22
percent of contested races for state high court included television
advertisements.1 0 0 In the very next cycle in 2002, and just a few
months removed from the White decision, with many candidates
and courts unsure as to the contours of the new norms, that
same figure climbed to 64 percent. 101 In 2004 and 2006, television
advertising appeared, respectively, in 80 and 91 percent of contested high-court campaigns. 102 It would be foolish to equate, in
this instance, correlation with causation-myriad factors and
developing trends were at play. It is, however, equally implausible to conclude that White, and the loosening of both codified restrictions as a matter of law and the corresponding loosening of
content norms as a matter of prudence, did not play a role.
More verifiably, White led state supreme courts around the
country to make substantial changes to their respective state

bear out this assertion. In 2010, the national judicial election flashpoints involved retention rather than contested elections. One 2010 judicial-election recap notes that in Iowa
the three Iowa Supreme Court justices, who were defeated in their retention contests on
account of a concerted effort by opponents of same-sex marriage, did very little to campaign on their own behalf, and were outspent nearly 4-1 in the election-one of them
explained earlier "[w]e did not want to contribute to the politicization of the judiciary here
in Iowa and so we have not formed campaign committees and we have not engaged in
fundraising." See C. David Kotok, Marriage Ruling Costs Iowa Judges, Omaha World
Herald (Nov 3, 2010), online at httpV/www.omaha.condarticle/20101103/NEWSo1/
711039884 (visited Sept 6, 2011); Josh Nelson, Chief Justice: Don't Politicize Judicial
System, WCF Courier (Oct 21, 2010), online at httpV/wcfcourier.coninews/loca/
article_722dbfe9-90dl-5ab3-b37f-a5a7f988e9ee.htnl (visited Sept 6, 2011). Conversely,
the recap notes that the "same lesson can be learned from Illinois, though the result was
quite different. In Illinois, Chief Justice Thomas Kilbride was facing a strong antiretention movement based on a series of 'anti-business' rulings over the past few
years.... [but] [u]nlike the Justices in Iowa, Justice Kilbride was a very aggressive fundraiser and campaigner, which allowed him to successfully beat back the challenge." Election Recap, (Choose Your Judges 2010), online at httpV/www.chooseyourjud
ges.org/ (visited Sept 9, 2011).
9 See generally Sample, et al, New Politics2010 (cited in note 79) (detailing judicial
campaign spending and other judicial election trends from 2000-2009).
100 Id at 24.
101

Id.

102 Id.

298

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2011:

codes of judicial conduct. 103 Likewise, the ABA revised its Model
Code of Judicial Conduct in accordance with White, while retaining the "pledge and promise" and "commit" clauses and offering
additional guidance-to the extent feasible-based on the tea
leaves in White as to nonannounce clause applicability. 10 4 In contrast to Schotland, Tom Phillips, who served as the Chief Justice
of the Texas Supreme Court for nearly two decades, asserts that
"White and its progeny (legitimate or otherwise), together with
the resulting code changes, have created a sea change in judicial
campaign practices."105
With respect to the implied assertion that certain of Whitds
progeny is "other" than legitimate, perhaps no decision in
White's aftermath is more criticized-or more illustrative of the
resulting disarray-than Weaver v Bonner.106 In Weaver, the
Eleventh Circuit struck down Georgia's rules prohibiting judicial
candidates from making false and misleading statements107 and
prohibiting judicial candidates from personally (as opposed to
through a designated campaign committee) soliciting campaign
contributions. 108
More sweeping than Weaver's holding, however, was the rationale behind it. The Weaver court declared: "[W]e believe that
the Supreme Court's decision in White suggests that the standard for judicial elections should be the same as the standard for
legislative and executive elections."109 Apparently, the Eleventh
Circuit either read White only selectively, or concluded that it
knew better what the Supreme Court majority thought than the
justices themselves, because the Weaver declaration commanded
103 See generally Gray, 93 Judicature 26 (cited in note 90). See also Phillips and Poll,
55 Drake L Rev at 701 (cited in note 58) (noting that "at least twenty-two state supreme
courts have amended their codes in response to White" and that "in at least six statesAlabama, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, South Dakota, and Vermont-judicial ethics advisory
committees or disciplinary bodies withdrew or amended earlier positions deemed inconsistent with White").
104 See Phillips and Poll, 55 Drake L Rev at 701 (cited in note 58).
101 Id at 702 (parenthetical in original).
106 309 F3d 1312 (11th Cir 2002). See, for example, Roy A. Schotland, Six FatalFlaws:
A Comment on Bopp and Neeley, 86 Denver U L Rev 233, 240 (2008) (noting that the
Eighth Circuit "panel's sua sponte activism led it to sweep away the entire [Georgia]
Canon"); Shira J. Goodman, David Caroline, and Lynn A. Marks, What's More Important:
Electing Judges or JudicialIndependence?It's Time for Pennsylvania to Choose Judicial
Independence, 48 Duquesne L Rev 859, 878-79 (2010) (noting that White and its progeny,
including Weaver, "have integrated judges further into the money side of their campaigns").
107 Weaver, 309 F3d at 1319.

10o Id at 1322.
1o

Id at 1321.
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a majority despite the Supreme Court's express statement that
"we neither assert nor imply that the First Amendment requires
campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative and executive office."" 0
One campaign practice that has waxed in the post- White era
is the interest-group questionnaire for judicial candidates and, in
turn, the dissemination of grossly oversimplified interest-group
literature based on those questionnaires.11 1 Whereas in prior
decades, "the judicial conduct code provisions allowed the candidates themselves to operate in a parallel universe," and to "generally ignore[ ] or evade[ ]" questionnaires "by pointing to the
ethical restrictions,"1 12 the loss of that buffer combined with the
need for campaign contributions and support dramatically increases the pressure on candidates. The result is that groups are
"able to demand that judicial candidates make general statements coming down on one side or the other" of an issue, and
candidates "find it difficult to resist such demands because these
organizations will likely make campaign contributions contingent upon a favorable response." 113
The questionnaires of several groups included an option for
candidates to decline to answer the questionnaires based on the
jurisdiction's applicable code of judicial conduct. 114 Far from ofWhite, 536 US at 783.
111 For visual examples of questionnaires from Kansas Judicial Watch and from the
Florida Family Policy Council, see James Sample, Lauren Jones, and Rachel Weiss, The
New Politics ofJudicialElections 2006 at 30, 32 (Justice at Stake Campaign 2007) ("New
Politics 2006"), online at http//brennan.3cdn.net/49cl8b6cbl8960b2f9_z6m62gwji.pdf
(visited Sept 6, 2011). For a visual example of the almost inevitably binary-only literature
that is the byproduct of such questionnaires, see id at 31 (picturing the literature image
from the 2006 Alabama contest between Drayton Nabers and Sue Bell Cobb indicating
"agree or disagree" options on propositions such as 'Unborn Child is Fellow Human Being," "Home School Education Tax Credits," "The State Can Acknowledge God," and
"Same Sex Marriage").
112 Phillips and Poll, 55 Drake L Rev at 702 (cited in note 58).
113 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: What Does the DecisionMean (Brennan
Center for Justice 2002), online at httpV/www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/
republican-party-of minnesota v_white whatdoesthedecision mean (visited Sept 6,
2011).
114 As one example, the "decline" to answer option on the Kansas Judicial Watch questionnaire included an asterisked footnote stating as follows:
110

This response indicates that I would answer this question, but believe that I am
or may be prohibited from doing so by Kansas Canon of Judicial Conduct
5A(3)(I) and (ii), which forbids judicial candidates from making "pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance
of the duties of the office" or "statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the court." This response also indicates that I would answer this question, but believe that, if I did so, then I will or may be required to recuse myself
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fering a fig leaf of protection for judicial independence, however,
candidates who checked the "decline" option created-whether
wittingly or unwittingly-the predicate for suits challenging the
cited provisions of the conduct codes.115 In response, many bar
associations, judges, and groups concerned about judicial independence came up with recommendations for judicial candidates
such as "never use the pre-printed answers provided on the questionnaire" and "never rely upon a judicial Canon to justify a decision not to respond."116 While this advice is clearly sound, it also
reflects, and to a certain degree promotes, the marginalization of
the codes themselves. Perhaps most effectively, some judges and
judicial candidates chose to respond to questionnaires with open
public letters aimed at reinforcing the proper role of a judge.
Perhaps the most widely disseminated and most effective such
letter-today, one might say it went "viral" within judicial and
courts circles-was that of Judge Peter D. Webster of Florida's
First District Court of Appeal:
I have spent a good portion of my life thinking about issues related to the judiciary. My experiences lead me to
conclude without reservation that questionnaires such as
that which I have received from your organization are illconceived. Over the long term, their impact cannot be anything but bad-bad for the judiciary as an institution;
bad for the rule of law; and bad for the people of Florida. I
say this because such questionnaires create the impression in the minds of voters that judges are no different
as a judge in any proceeding concerning this answer on account of Kansas Canon 3E(1), which requires a judge or judicial candidate to recuse him or herself
when "the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . ."
National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Judicial Campaign Oversight, How Should
Judicial Candidates Respond to Questionnaires? 1 (Aug 29, 2008), online at
http/www.judicialcampaignconduct.org/2008%20Updated%20Advice-onQuestionnaires.
pdf (visited Sept 6, 2011) (noting that "[a]n almost identical paragraph has been used on
similar questionnaires in other states, e.g. Tennessee in 2006 and Florida in 2008").
115 Midwest Democracy Network and Justice at Stake Campaign, Guidelines for Judicial Candidates:Running Campaigns ThatEducate the Publicand Promote Confidence in
the Courts, Memorandum for Midwest Court Candidates 6 (Sept 2008), online at
http//www.justiceatstake.org/media/cmWJASMWMemorev_50F6EDD22B678.pdf (visited
Sept 6, 2011). See also Sample, et al, New Politics 2006 at 29 (cited in note 111) (noting
that the "strategy in which candidates who cite the Code of Judicial Conduct as a reason
for declining to respond ends up triggering lawsuits challenging provisions in the Code"
and that "[s]uch lawsuits have been brought in Alaska, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania").
116 Midwest Democracy Network, Guidelines for JudicialCandidates at *5 (cited in
note 115).
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from politicians-that they decide cases based on their
personal biases and prejudices.11 7
The response of Texas Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson to the
"Free Market Foundation Voters' Guide" questionnaire in 2006
noted that Jefferson "elected not to answer some of the questions" because, while he had "opinions on many areas of substantive law," he makes "it a practice to give litigants the opportunity
to persuade me, based on the facts of their case and any developments in the law, that their position is meritorious."1 18 Particularly pertinent to scenarios such as the "Lawyer Ketchum v
Jurist Ketchum" sequence described in Part I of this Article, and
to Judge Easterbrook's model of post-Capertonanalysis in Bauer
v Shepard,which is detailed in Part III, is Chief Justice Jefferson's statement of his further reason for declining to respond:
Second, I would be subject to recusal were I to express an
opinion on disputed legal issues before the case is actually
decided by my Court. I have an obligation to minimize the
areas in which recusal would be warranted so that I can
be a participant, and not a spectator, in the administration of justice.11 9
Indeed, despite the limitations of anecdote, the best way to
sum up the state of judicial post- White confusion and disarray
may be via a series of comparisons illustrating the chasm between the opposing interpretations of White.
Compare, for example, Chief Justice Jefferson's approach to
Justice Ketchum's. Similarly, consider the difference between the
White majority's express caveat that they "neither assertled] nor
impl[ied] that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative office" with
the Eleventh Circuit's declaration in Weaver. For better or
worse, and it almost certainly is the latter, material for such illustrative comparisons is in ample supply. Arguably, the divergence of post- White norms could scarcely be better illustrated
than via a comparison of jurists such as Chief Justice Jefferson
and Judge Peter Webster, as reflected in their respective responsive letters quoted above, with, for example, the radio advertiseSample, et al, New Politics 2006at 33 (cited in note 111).
National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee, How ShouldJudicialCandidatesRespond to
Questionnaires?at *3 (cited in note 114) (excerpt from a 2006 letter by Judge Jefferson of
Texas declining to answer the questionnaire).
117
118

119 Id.
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ment run by incumbent Alabama Supreme Court Justice Tom
Parker in 2010, in which he likened United States District Court
Judge Virginia Phillips, who struck down the military's Don't
Ask Don't Tell policy, to the threat posed by Al Qaeda. 120 According to Parker's radio spot, "[m]ost people believe al-Qaeda is one
of America's biggest security threats. I think it's time to add liberal activist judges like Judge Phillips to that list."121 According
to Parker, that comparison is justified because "liberal activists
like Judge Phillips are overturning marriage laws, raising taxes,
violating property rights, and now they are attacking our very
nationalsecurity."122
Chief Justice Jefferson and Judge Webster provide just two
examples of the thousands of candidates and judges-elected and
appointed-who remain willing to swim against the currents; to
approach the judicial role with a restraint reflective of rigorous
respect for both the rule and process of law. To the extent that
the canons protect and promote the judicial role, they serve a
high purpose. After all, "impartiality is not an end in itself. It is
an instrumental value designed to preserve a different end altogether: the rule of law."12 3
Nearly a decade removed from White, facing financial and
interest-group pressure, many state jurists and judicial candidates find themselves struggling with an increasingly challenging dilemma: to signal or not to signal? As the relative costbenefit analysis for an isolated individual continues to diverge
from the less favorable cost-benefit analysis for society writ
large, jurists like Ketchum and Parker remain, for now, the exceptions. In White's aftermath, however, the exceptions are increasing in both number and degree. And it is becoming difficult
to conclude that the pushing of the envelope is not inevitably resulting in a feedback loop producing yet more of the same-and
consequent erosion in the perception and actuality of the rule of
law.
B. New York State Boardof Elections vLdpez Torres
For the purposes of divining a developing doctrinal approach
to judicial elections, the least critical of the decade's three Su120 See Peter Hardin, CampaignAd Likens US Judge and Terrorists(Justice at Stake
Campaign 2010), online at http/www.gavelgrab.org/?p=14986 (visited Sept 9, 2011).
121 Id.

122 Id (emphasis added).
123 Geyh, 64 Ohio St L J at 65 (cited in note 48).
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preme Court cases is Lopez Torres.Accordingly, relative to White
and Caperton, this Article's treatment of Lopez Torres is quite
brief. Lopez Torres does, however, offer substantially more than
has been recognized in the literature with respect to the recent
evolution of the Court's views on elected judiciaries. In New York
State, the trial court of general jurisdiction is, bizarrely but enduringly, called the Supreme Court of New York. 124 For the most
part, Lopez Torres, while involving a system of convention-based
nominations for that court, is not really a case about judicial selection, so much as it is a case about a particular-and particularly byzantine-convention-based nomination system, where the
nominees just happen to be candidates for judicial, as opposed to
legislative or executive, office. 125
In Ldpez Torres,the district court preliminarily enjoined the
judicial nominating conventions as violating the First Amendment, and the Second Circuit affirmed, on the ground that the
practical requirements of the statutorily mandated systems were
"insurmountable" for candidates like Judge L6pez Torres, who
are widely supported by party members-and who indeed won
primary and general elections for judicial offices not subject to
the convention-but not supported by the local party leader. 126
The party leader, the lower courts found, is, as a practical and
factual matter, able to exert complete-or at least outcome guaranteeing-control over the process. 127 As one might imagine,
such an extraordinary concentration of power leads inexorably to
abuse of that power. Controlling the convention machinery to
block Judge L6pez Torres's candidacy, despite her support among
the party's voters, as retribution for her "consistent refusal" to
engage in "patronage hires" 128 while a civil court judge, is one
such abuse. The Supreme Court, finding no constitutional claim,
124 See NY Const Art VI, §§ 7, 8.
125 See Ldpez Torres, 552 US at 199-200. It bears noting here by way of disclosure,
that having had the distinct privilege of serving as one of the attorneys who represented
the plaintiffs, including Judge Margarita Lpez Torres, I am anything but neutral on the
topic of Lopez Torres. Suffice it to say that on the merits of the claims involved, I favor
the opinion of United States District Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District of New
York and the opinion affirming him by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Ultimately, those opinions, however, did not hold sway. See Lopez Torres v New
York State Board ofElections, 462 F3d 161 (2d Cir 2006); Lopez Torres vNew York State
Board of Elections, 411 F Supp 2d 212 (EDNY 2006). The views described herein with
respect to Ldpez Torres, while consistent with the posture of the plaintiffs whom I (with
co-counsel) was privileged to represent in the litigation, are entirely my own.
126 See Ldpez Torres,552 US at 201.
127 Id at 202 (citing lower court decisions).
128 Id at 201.

304

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2011:

reversed. 129 Ellen Katz captures the analysis in Lopez Torres as
follows: "Most notably, Lopez Torres examined New York's regime solely as state statutes describe it, and disregarded how it
operates in practice. The Court never disagreed with the lower
courts' finding that New York's system is functionally impenetrable to challenger candidates and their supporters."13 0 As a
strictly legal (as opposed to functional) matter, however, the
Court found the process "legally accessible." 3 1
Whatever the merits of such fact-detached formalism in the
context of an election for legislative or executive office, it is notable that Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, as he did in setting
forth the impartiality taxonomy in White, was unconcerned by
the impartiality implications of New York's system. This embrace of rigid formalism enabled the Court to wash its hands of
the underside of a system described by political scientists Thomas Mann and Norman Orenstein (of the Brookings Institution
and the American Enterprise Institute, respectively) as follows:
[A]lthough New York's ...

scheme may ensure that Su-

preme Court Justices are independent of public opinion, it
makes them completely dependent on local party leaders,
a group that represents neither the party voters nor the
general citizenry. As a result, Supreme Court judgeships
and many below them in the New York judicial hierarchy
have become objects of local party patronage, where party
bosses not only control who becomes a judge but also feel
free to demand whom judges hire in their most important
and sensitive positions.132

129 Id at 209.
130 Ellen Katz, Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the Retreat from Election Law, 93

Minn L Rev 1615, 1619 (2009) (emphasis added), citing Lopez Torres, 552 US at 207.
131 Katz, 93 Minn L Rev at 1619 (emphasis omitted) (cited in note 130). Katz asserts
that the Court "steadfastly refused to examine the system's cumulative effects and came
close to embracing what Justice Stevens's dissent in Clingman described as 'empty formalism.'" Id at 1620, citing Clingman vBeaver, 544 US 581, 610 (2005) (Stevens dissenting). See also Norman L. Greene, Advancing the Rule of Law through JudicialSelection
Reform: Is the New York Court of Appeals Judicial Selection Process the Least of Our
Concems in New York., 72 Albany L Rev 633, 646 (2009) ("According to the . . . findings
in Lopez Torres, which the U.S. Supreme Court's reversal did not disturb, political parties
(or political bosses) have extensive control over judicial selection in the New York Supreme Court; and voters are left to ratify those choices at the general election.").
132 Brief Amid Curiae Thomas Mann, Norman Ornstein, the Reform Institute, and
Campaign Legal Center in Support of Respondents, New York State Board ofElections v
Lpez Torres, Civil Action No. 06-766, *2-3 (filed July 13, 2007) (available on Westlaw at
2007 WL 2047542) ("Mann Brief" hereinafter).
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Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion but wrote a separate one-paragraph concurrence joined by Justice Souter, stating
that the holding "should not be misread as endorsement of the
electoral system under review, or disagreement with the findings
of the District Court that describe glaring deficiencies in that
system." 133 Whatever one's view as to the decision upholding the
constitutionality of New York's system, it is definitively uniquethere is not another elective or convention system like it, for judicial or nonjudicial office-anywhere in the country.134 Yet, even
faced with such a one-off-type system, the very fact that the system contained the patina of an election was opening enough for
Justice Stevens to assert that the system's "glaring deficiencies
...

even lend support to the broader proposition that the very

practice of electing judges is unwise. But as I recall my esteemed
former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous
occasions: 'The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from
1 35
enacting stupid laws.'"
Justice Kennedy concurred in the Ldpez Torres judgment
but was the lone justice not to join the Court's opinion. 136 Joined
by Justice Breyer with respect to the portion of the concurrence
discussed herein, Justice Kennedy wrote that he found it "understandable that the Court refrains from commenting upon the use
of elections to select the judges of the State's courts of general
jurisdiction, for New York has the authority to make that decision," but that a "closing observation, however, seems to be in
order." 137
The substantive portion of Kennedy's "closing observation"
begins: "When one considers that elections require candidates to
conduct campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to
allow for competition among interestgroups and political parties,
the persisting question is whether that process is consistent with
the perception and the reality ofjudicialindependence and judicial excellence." 138
133 Lopez Torres, 552 US at 209 (Stevens concurring).
13 Mann Brief at *4 ("[The New York system is unique, and has no parallel in anoth-

er state or jurisdiction.").
135 Lopez Torres,552 US at 209 (Stevens concurring).
136 Id at 209 (Kennedy concurring).
137 Id at 212 (Kennedy concurring).
138 Id (Kennedy concurring) (emphasis added). First, it is notable in itself that the
"closing observation" was, of course, entirely sua sponte, and completely unnecessary in
any real sense of the term-Justice Kennedy had already, in Part I of his concurrence,
explained his reasoning with respect to why he concurred in the judgment. In addition,
Kennedy, who concurred in White, and Breyer, who dissented in White, joined together in
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With those words, Kennedy, who has consistently been on
the antiregulatory, First Amendment "side" of every major campaign-finance case since joining the high court, 139 and who was
likewise on the First Amendment "side" in the actual speech (as
opposed to financial speech) dispute in White, signaled more
than mere policy reservations as to the nexus of money and the
courts. 1 4 0 First, the sentence recognizes a unique tension, created
specifically by money, for the state interest in maintaining the
integrity of its judiciary-an interest that Kennedy had described in White as of "vital importance." 141 Second, applied to
the context of a particular case, the reference to "interest groups"
arguably implicates the first impartiality type in the White taxonomy (bias in favor of or against a party), and unequivocally
implicates concerns with the combination of money and the
group-based biases that this Article terms as impartiality type
1.5.142 Third, it reflects Kennedy's sensitivity to both the reality
and perception of judicial independence-the latter being oftdiscussed by courts but rarely having the constitutional teeth
Kennedy would come to ascribe to it in Capertdon.143 Kennedy,
indeed, expanded on this point in the Ldpez Torres concurrence,
noting the "rule of law, which is a foundation of freedom, presupposes a functioning judiciary respected for its independence, its
professional attainments, and the absolute probity of its judg-

transmitting the same message. This point of agreement was scarcely recognized as
meaningful at the time or since, in part because it is hardly unusual for Kennedy and
Breyer to agree (particularly when the judgment of the Court is unanimous).
139 See, for example, McConnell vFederalElectionCommission, 540 US 93, 286 (2003)
(Kennedy dissenting in part and concurring in part); Federal Election Commission v
Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 US 449, 483 (2007) (Kennedy concurring); Davis v Federal

Election Commission, 554 US 724, 728 (2008) (Kennedy joining Alito's majority opinion);
Citizens United v FederalElection Commission, 130 S Ct 876, 886 (2010) (Kennedy delivering the majority opinion).
140 It is worth noting, though, that Justice Kennedy had already demonstrated in
White that his thinking with respect to state judicial elections was not in lockstep with
the Court. Moreover, he had signaled in White that his analysis was particularly focused
on process-based rule of law concerns. See discussion of Kennedy's concurrence in White

in Part II.A.1.b (noting that states "may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due
process requires"). Kennedy's "more rigorous" recusal point in the White concurrence and
his Lopez Torres "closing observation" are both animated by rule of law concerns. Kennedy's Lopez Torres opinion, however, also seems to reflect the subtle refinements of time
and further evolution of thought specifically on the topic of state judicial elections, and
even a desire to affirmatively transmit that message though not necessary to his reasoning in the case.
141 White, 536 US at 793 (Kennedy concurring).
142 See Part II.A.

143 See Caperton vA. T Massey Coal Co, 1239 S Ct at 2266 (2009); discussion of appearance in Capertonat Part II.C.
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es."1 4 4 Consider that if, as Kennedy further asserts: "it may seem
difficult to reconcile these aspirations with elections" as a general matter, then, a fortiori, the most extreme factual manifestation of those concerns that the brave new world of elections has
yet had to offer-the scenario in Caperton-poses a severe threat
to that very presupposition, and thus, derivatively, to the rule of
law.
In considering Justice Kennedy's thinking with regard to judicial elections, it bears noting that, in the period between White
and Ldpez Torres, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, respectively.14 5 With that transition, Justice O'Connor's commitment to
state courts would manifest itself in varied ways, 146 but without
a doubt, her biggest initial splash came in a 2006 conference she
cochaired with the justice who joined Justice Kennedy's concurrence, Justice Breyer.147 In addition to an audience only cochairs
of such esteem could produce, 148 Most importantly, the participants included, as both speakers and as audience members, Justice O'Connor and six then-sitting Supreme Court justices.14 9 Indiana Chief Justice Randall Shepard found the most important
aspect of the conference to be the "willingness of a majority of the
Supreme Court justices to sit down and listen the whole day ....
[MI]embers of the Court [ ] sat there and listened to people talk
about them .... The image of it is just striking. It says an enormous amount about their commitment to this enterprise."15 0
144 Lopez Torres, 552 US at 212 (Kennedy concurring) (emphasis added).
145 See Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Courts of the
Unites States, online at http/www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (visited Sept
6, 2011).
146 See Biskupic, O'ConnorRetired from Court, Not Discourse,USA Today at 2A (cited
in note 76).
147 See Greg Langlois and Anne Cassidy, Fairand Independent Courts: A Conference
on the State of the Judiciary (Georgetown Sept 28, 2010), online at
httpsf/www.law.georgetown.edu/new Wevents/conference-story.html
(visited Sept 6,
2011).
148 See id (stating that attendees included nonlawyers like Berkshire Hathaway
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Warren Buffet, Washington Post Company
Chairman and CEO Don Graham, and RAND Corporation President and CEO James
Thomson; lawyers in attendance included then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, former Solicitors General Theodore Olson and Walter Dellinger, and then-Solicitor General
Paul Clement, as well as NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund Director-Counsel
and President Theodore Shaw; speakers and attendees included numerous federal and
state court judges and justices as well as prominent academics).
149 See id (noting that in addition to Breyer, Justices Samuel Alito, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and Clarence Thomas all attended conference programs, and Chief
Justice John Roberts delivered an address).
150 Id.
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While, as it happens, Kennedy was not one of the justices
who attended the event, there can be little doubt that he was
well aware of its content, and particularly of the evolution in
O'Connor's thinking-and of her tireless efforts, discussed earlier
in this Article. 51 Indeed, one aspect of Kennedy's "closing observation" stands in stark contrast to what this Article describes as
the "it's-the-state's-fault-for-choosing-the-system-in-the-first place" spirit of O'Connor's White concurrencel 52 and in equally stark
parallel to O'Connor's postretirement embrace of reform
measures that stop short of moving to appointment systems. According to Kennedy in Ldpez Torres, while the Constitution
chooses appointments for its federal judges, "most States have
made the opposite choice,"153 and thus, in light of the "longstanding practice and tradition" of elected judges in the states, "the
appropriate practical response is not to reject judicial elections
outright but to find ways to use elections to select judges with
the highest qualifications."154
Finally, Kennedy asserts, quite rightly, that "[e]ven in
flawed election systems there emerge brave and honorable judges who exemplify the law's ideals. But it is unfair to them and to
the concept of judicial independence if the State is indifferent to
a selection process open to manipulation, criticism, and serious
abuse."155 Clearly, at the time he wrote those remarks in late
2007 and/or January 2008, Justice Kennedy was not thinking of
West Virginia's Brent Benjamin. The Caperton sequence described below was still developing and would first be presented to
the Court in a cert petition filed in July 2008.156 This Article asserts, however, that it is scarcely unreasonable to think that Justice Kennedy's call to arms in Ldpez Torres, and particularly his
eschewing of "indifferen[ce]" to abuses of fairness and judicial
independence, influenced his thinking both with respect to the
Capertonpetition and ultimately, in his decision for the Court.157
151 See discussion in Part II.A.1.a.
152 See note 74 and accompanying text.
'sa Lopez Torres, 552 US at 212 (Kennedy concurring).
154 Id (Kennedy concurring) (emphasis added) (Justice Kennedy also noted that the
"organized bar, the legal academy, public advocacy groups, a principled press, and all the
other components of functioning democracy must engage" in the process of finding ways
to use elections to promote "fair and open" elections.).
155 Id at 212-13 (Kennedy concurring).
156 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Caperton v A. T Massey Coal Co, No 08-22
(filed July 2, 2008) (available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 2676568) ("Caperton Cert Petition").
157 Lpez Torres, 552 US at 213.
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C. Caperton vA. T. Massey Coal Co, Inc
Rare is the case with facts as compelling as those in Caperton;15 8 it is difficult to resist the allure of giving the facts and the
opinion they generated extensive treatment here. But because,
like many others, 15 9 I have covered Caperton and its early aftermath in great detail elsewhere, 160 this Article treats the case in a
relatively cursory fashion and then focuses specifically on Caperton's relationship to the developing doctrinal approach to judicial
elections discussed within this Article. Thus, in Caperton, West
Virginia Justice Brent Benjamin refused to recuse himself from
the appeal of the $50 million jury verdict against Massey Coal,
even though Don Blankenship, Massey's CEO, spent $3 million
supporting Benjamin's campaign for a seat on the court-more
than all other supporters of Benjamin's campaign combined158 129 S Ct 2252 (2009).

159 The Harvard and Syracuse Law Reviews each published symposium issues devoted
to Caperton. For further background and discussion, Keith Swisher's excellent article
usefully cites each individual symposium contribution. See Keith Swisher, ProProsecutionJudges: 'Tough on Crime,"Soft on Strategy,Ripe for Disqualification,52 Ariz
L Rev 317, 340 n 88 (2010).
16o See James Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 Syracuse L
Rev 293, 303-04 (2010) (arguing that, although Capertonoverturned a judge's decision of
nonrecusal, its outcome will not result in the end of judicial elections; instead, Caperton's
import and long-lasting result will be stricter and clearer recusal rules for judges that
will be vigorously enforced when judges face conflicts of interest); James Sample, Court
Reform Enters the Post-CapertonEra, 58 Drake L Rev 787 (2010) (surveying the postCaperton developments in the areas of recusal regulation, judicial independence, and the
influence of money on, if nothing else, judicial selection practices, with a primary focus on
such efforts made in the state courts of Wisconsin, Michigan, and West Virginia; expounding on federal developments and a "renewed congressional interest in judicial disqualification"; and concluding that, while the year since the 2009 landmark decision has
certainly felt mixed effects, it has in large ignited a trend towards revitalizing the public's
confidence in judicial integrity); Sample, et al, New Politics 2010 (cited in note 79) (arguing that Caperton incentivizes states to adopt revised regulations guiding recusal practices); James Sample, Democracyat the Corner ofFirstand Fourteenth:JudicialCampaign
Spending and Equality, 66 NYU Ann Surv Am L 2011 (forthcoming 2011), online at
http/works.bepress.con/james-sample/1/ (visited Sept 6, 2011) (describing the distinction between independent expenditures and direct contributions as they pertain to judicial campaigns, while detailing their similar effects: threatening the impartiality of judicial election practices, and thus "creat[ing] an independent state interest in regulating
not only campaign contributions, but also expenditures").
Both by way of disclosure and context, I had the privilege of authoring amicus
briefs in support of the Caperton Petitioners at the certiorari and merits stage, and of
working with Petitioners' outstanding counsel to coordinate other briefs. In my view,
however, nothing I or anyone else will ever write about the case will ever be as compelling
as the words of Hugh Caperton himself. If the personal side of the case is of interest, in
my view, there is no better way to spend five minutes than by viewing his comments at
the National Press Club. See Video of 'New Politics Event" 'Justicefor Sale?' (Justice at
Stake Campaign 2009), online at httpV/www.justiceatstake.org/resources/new_poli
ticsofjudicial elections_20002009/video of newpolitics eventjustice_forsale.cfm
(visited Sept 9, 2011).
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while Blankenship and Massey were preparing to appeal the
verdict. After winning election to the court, Justice Benjamin
cast the deciding vote in the court's 3-2 decision overturning that
verdict.161

The Court, with Justice Kennedy writing the opinion for a 54 majority, started quite literally with first principles, noting
that "[i]t is axiomatic that 'a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.'"162 It then reasoned from the principles of its precedents 6 3 to hold that Benjamin's refusal to disqualify himself violated due process.164 According to the Court,
due process was jeopardized by the "serious risk of actual biasbased on objective and reasonable perceptions."165
The most significant indicator that Justice Kennedy might
be inclined towards an outcome consistent not with the results
he reached in the earlier cases, but rather, with the evolving signals he sent in those cases that are considered in this Article,
came during this exchange in oral argument, involving Massey's
counsel Andrew Frey:
JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, I-as I understand it, although
you never directly, I don't think you ever directly answered it, I-I understood you to imply in response to
Justice Stevens that there would be no appearance problem that would ever justify a constitutional standard.
MR. FREY: Appearance is a standard for recusal, a nonconstitutional statutory standard for recusal in virtually
every State, so we already have-and in the Federal system, so-

161 Caperton, 129 S Ct at 2258.

162 Id at 2259, citing In re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136 (1955).
163 See Penny White, Relinquished Responsibilities, 123 Harv L Rev 120, 125 (2009)
(noting that "the majority used TumefVs bricks and Murchison's and Lavoids mortar to
cobble together a new category of judicial disqualification necessitated by emerging problems but based upon an existing constitutional right"), citing Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510,
532 (1927); Murchison, 349 US at 136; Aetna Life Insurance Co v Lavoie, 475 US 813
(1986).
164 See Caperton,129 S Ct at 2258.
165 Id at 2263. The Court explained that this serious risk existed "when a person with
a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign
when the case was pending or imminent." Id at 2263--64. The Court noted that "[t]he
inquiry centers on the contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of
money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election." Id at 2264.
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JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes. And we have-and we have an
appearance standard under the ABA Canons, but I think
it would be difficult to make a very convincing argument
that that standard was effective in this case.
MR. FREY: Well, that-that's a matter of opinion. I-IJUSTICE SOUTER: Well, it's-it's the matter of opinion
that brings the case before us. And would you agree-I
am not-I am not asking you to agree that the ABA
standard was violated. That's not what you're here for.
But would you agree that the ABA standard is certainly
implicated by the facts of this case, whatever the ultimate
recusal decision should have been?
MR. FREY: I think I would agree that reasonable people
could have a different view one way or the other about
whether there is an appearance of impropriety for Justice
Benjamin sitting. I would agree with that. I don't think I
would go further than that because my personal view is
that there was no impropriety, that it was reasonable,
and if you read his opinion I think you'll see a-a fair,
balanced, thoughtful statement of the reasons why he
feels he could sit.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: I want you to be able to elaborate
your full theory of the case, but just so you know, it-it
does seem to me that the appearance standard has-has
much to recommend it. In part it means that you don't
have to inquire into the actual bias; it's-it's more objective. Now, of course it has to be controlled, it has to be
precise. But I just thought that you know that I-I do
have that inclination.
MR. FREY: But-but we're here on the question of constitutional requirements and the ConstitutionJUSTICE KENNEDY: And we're asking-we're asking
what substance we can give to the constitutional protection.16 6

166 Transcript of Oral Argument, Caperton v A. T Massey Coal Co, Civil Action No 0822, *31-34 (Mar 3, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 WL 527723) ("Caperton Oral
Argument Transcript" hereinafter).
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The above exchange is compelling in many respects but particularly if interpreted as the culmination of several incremental
steps in Justice Kennedy's thinking on judicial elections, that led
him, over a period of nearly a decade, to the Court's landmark,
67 As
and in my view, eminently correct decision in Caperton.1
with any attempt to quantify and cabin a gradual process, identifying particular discrete steps involves a series of arbitrary-but,
ideally also helpful-lines of demarcation. With that caveat, this
Article chronicles what one might term Justice Kennedy's Seven
Steps to Capertonand his Citizens UnitedPostscript.
First, the exchange above demonstrates the seriousness of
Kennedy's perspective in White as to the "vital importance" of
maintaining the integrity of the judiciary.' 6 8
Second, Kennedy's "more rigorous" recusal statement in
White reinforced the predicate floor of constitutionally mandated
disqualification.16 9 As of White, we did not know exactly where
that floor might be save for in the Court's existing precedents,
which, while offering the analogies that the Court ultimately
embraced, did not address campaign support.
Third, by reinforcing that predicate floor in the context of
White-a judicial elections case that would subsequently give
Justice O'Connor "pause" and cause upheaval and disarray in the
lower federal and state courts-he laid an architectural framework to eventually bridge from the Court's existing due process
precedents to the judicial elections context.
Fourth, Kennedy differentiated, in First Amendment terms,
between the announce-clause restriction-which he viewed as
depriving voters of valuable information, in service of an inadequately defined interest-and his concern, articulated first in
Ldpez Torres, as to the need to "raise funds" from "interest
167 Similarly recognizing aspects of this evolution, Rick Hasen, in the course of considering Justice Kennedy's differential treatment of independent campaign expenditures in
Caperton with his treatment of independent campaign expenditures in Citizens United,
speculates that Justice Kennedy perhaps has come to reject what Justice Ginsburg, in her
dissent in White, "disparagingly termed a 'unilocular, an election is an election, approach'
to the First Amendment," and notes that "by Caperton he had more fully expressed his
reservations about judicial elections." Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion
of Coherence, 109 Mich L Rev 581, 614 (forthcoming 2011), online at http/papers.ss
rn.conVsol2/papers.cfm?abstractLid=1620576 (visited Sept 9, 2011) (citing Justice Ginsburg's dissent in White where she stated, "I do not agree with this unilocular [sic], 'an
election is an election,' approach. Instead, I would differentiate elections for political
offices, in which the First Amendment holds full sway, from elections designed to select
those whose office it is to administer justice without respect to persons.").
168 See discussion in Part II.A.1.b.
169 See White, 536 US at 794 (noting that states "may adopt recusal standards more
rigorous than due process requires").
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groups" who may then appear before the courts. Consider, in this
regard, the striking similarity of this portion of Kennedy's words
in Ldpez Torres to Justice O'Connor's words in a Wall Street
Journalop-ed published just two months prior to the Court's decision in Ldpez Torres.170 In that op-ed O'Connor wrote that contributions from lawyers and litigants "threaten the integrity of
judicial selection and compromise the public perception of judicial decisions."17 1
Fifth, the above colloquy's emphasis on "appearance" is an
especially strong confirmation that Kennedy was not merely adding boilerplate verbiage in writing of the importance of both the
reality and the "perception"172 in Ldpez Torres, but was rather
pointing to two distinct and separate concerns and the corresponding need to give "substance ... to the constitutional protection."173
Sixth, Kennedy's notion, articulated in Lopez Torres,that it
is "unfair" to the judges who exemplify the rule of law and "to the
concept of judicial independence if the State is indifferent to a
selection process open to manipulation, criticism, and serious
abuse," is particularly apt in Caperton.174 This is so because
Caperton presented an easy state question in which the disregard of the clear state rule "gave birth to the difficult federal issue."I 75
West Virginia's Code of Judicial Conduct required Justice
Benjamin's disqualification whenever his impartiality "might
reasonably be questioned." 76 Under the code, Justice Benjamin's
170 Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice for Sale, Wall St J A25 (Nov 15, 2007).
171 Id.
172 See note 138 and accompanying text.
173 Caperton Oral Argument Transcript at 33-34 (cited in note 166). See also discussion in Part II.B.
174 Lopez Torres,552 US at 212-13 (Kennedy concurring).
175 Sample, 60 Syracuse L Rev at 294 (cited in note 160). Notably, this view is shared
by many leading First Amendment scholars who, in the context of campaign finance cases
for nonjudicial offices, are like Justice Kennedy, on the deregulatory side. For example,
Kathleen Sullivan, speaking at a recent conference, stated that "the outcome in the
Capertoncase is clear. Given all the particular facts and optics in the case, Justice Benjamin should have recused himself under either the West Virginia standard or the ABA
standard. In other words, it should have been an easy matter that did not have to go to a
due process ruling." Kathleen Sullivan, One Symptom of a Serious Problem: Caperton v.
Massey (symposium transcript), 33 Seattle U L Rev 569, 584 (2010). In a scathing but
thoughtful and thorough article, Jeffrey Stempel catalogs the specific-and often glaring-shortcomings of Justice Benjamin's analysis, and Stempel notes that "the more one
knows about Justice Benjamin's refusal to recuse, the worse it looks for him and the
judicial system." Stempel, 47 San Diego L Rev at 28 (cited in note 20).
176 W Va Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1) (2009).
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responsibility to disqualify was not a close call. "Applying the
facts to the terms of the state rule, 'might' it have been 'reasonable' to question Benjamin's impartiality? To answer that question
in the negative not only strains credibility, but also renders the
provision a nullity."' 77 This is to say that "it is important to
acknowledge that if Benjamin had complied with the state rule,

or if the state had otherwise ensured Benjamin's disqualification,
there would have been absolutely no constitutional case."178
Procedurally, as remains true in most states,'7 9 there was no
available state recourse following Benjamin's repeated unilateral
refusals to disqualify himself under the applicable state code.
Thus, viewed through the lens of Justice Kennedy's words, precisely because of the state's "indifference" (absent the Court intervening in the case to reinforce the constitutional floor), the
judges about whom Kennedy was concerned, as well as the perception and possibly the reality of judicial independence, would
have suffered precisely the "unfair[ness]" to which he pointed in

Lopez Torres.80

This "sixth" point is particularly critical to an understanding
of Caperton's prospective import, and, in my view, is a particularly powerful rejoinder to the Chief Justice Roberts's questions
in dissent 81 and those commentators who have criticized the de177 Sample, 60 Syracuse L Rev at 294 (cited in note 160). See also Brief Amici Curiae
of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices in Support of Petitioners, Caperton v A. T Massey Coal Co, Civil Action No 08-22, *5 (2009) (stating unequivocally that, even apart from
the constitutional issue, the twenty-seven former justices "uniformly believe[d] that the
participation of Justice Benjamin ... created an appearance of impropriety. All amici
participating in this brief would have recused if they had benefited from the level and
proportion of independent expenditures by the CEO of a party to a case pending before
the court.").
178 Sample, 60 Syracuse L Rev at 294 (cited in note 160) (emphasis added).
179 As explored along with other state level post-Capertondevelopments in Sample, 58
Drake L Rev at 790-91 (cited in note 160). In response to Caperton, Michigan adopted a
new administrative rule whereby the objective component of that standard would no
longer be subject to the fundamental flaw exposed in Caperton itself-the entirely subjective and unreviewable determination of that objective standard by the target judge herself. See Mich Comp Laws Ann § 2.003(C)(1)(b) (West 2010).
1so See note 155 and accompanying text.
181 Caperton, 129 S Ct at 2269-72 (Roberts dissenting) (listing forty numbered questions that Chief Justice Roberts characterizes as "only a few uncertainties that quickly
come to mind"). Keith Swisher's excellent piece on the Judicial Ethics Forum, addressing
Chief Justice Roberts's questions in dissent, does a masterful job of noting that many of
the line-drawing questions could just as easily be flipped in reverse. See Keith Swisher,

Caperton:Answers to the Chief Justice's "Twenty Questions" Times Two, The Judicial
Ethics Forum (June 15, 2008), online at httpihudicialethicsforum.con/2009/
06/15/caperton-answers-to-chief-justice-roberts-twenty-questions-times-two/ (visited Sept
9, 2011) (noting that "an umpire who merely calls balls and strikes should be less concerned with questions not before the court, and indeed, every case could spawn a multitude of forward-looking questions not raised by the facts at hand").
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cision as "largely unworkable." 182 Imagine, for a moment, the
consequences if the Court had failed to step in, even despite the
extraordinary facts in Caperton.
With respect to the possibility of "unfairness" (to borrow Justice Kennedy's word), I asserted in an amicus brief that if the
Court failed to "speak decisively" in Caperton,"the message will
be clear: Litigants, lawyers, and judges will understand that the
Due Process Clause imposes no meaningful constraints on attempts to buy influence, even in pending cases." 18 3 While that
alone would have imposed serious consequences on the courts, it
would also have imposed a special, concentrated unfairness on
the actors within the process-litigants, lawyers, and judgeswho, whether out of probity, heightened regard for appearances,
or even risk aversion, would have put themselves at a comparative disadvantage had such a scenario ultimately obtained. That
is to say, if the Court had declined to hold that Caperton's facts
fell beneath the floor of due process, such a decision would have
been interpreted as "license by future actors in the shoes of Mr.
Blankenship and Justice Benjamin [and t]he resulting race to
the bottom [would] severely corrode both the quality and perception of American justice." 184
Seventh, even if Justice Kennedy might have otherwise had
lingering reservations about-if one will indulge the metaphorcrossing the Rubicon to the other side in the context of Caperton,
they were likely substantially mitigated by the knowledge that
he was hardly going it alone. In this regard Petitioners' lead
counsel, Ted Olson, made a similar crossing in the sense of concluding that the nexus of money and judicial elections is different
in constitutionally salient ways from the nexus of money and

182 Stephen M. Hoersting and Bradley A. Smith, The Caperton Caper and the Kennedy Conundrum, 2009 Cato Sup Ct Rev 319, 319 (2009). One curiosity of this argument, of
course, is that most if not all of the decision's critics just as surely would have criticized
the Court if it had reached out to draw bright-line rules that were not necessary to decide
the case. Moreover, Rick Pildes, among others, notes persuasively the decision's particular value from a constitutional-boundary-enforcing perspective. See Rick Pildes, Caperton
and Boundary-EnforcingJustices PartII: How Vague Law Can Create Stable Outcomes,
Balkanization (June 25, 2009), online at http//balkin.blogspot.con/2009/06/caperton-andboundary-enforcing.html (visited Sept 9, 2011) (asserting that, in analyzing the decision,
Chief Justice Roberts and critical commentators "fail to consider . .. that the enforcement
might include other institutional actors not constrained in the same way the Court is").
183 Brief of Amici Curiae the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, the
Campaign Legal Center, and the Reform Institute in Support of Petitioners, Caperton v
A. T Massey Coal Co, Civil Action No 08-22, *4 (filed Jan 5, 2009) (available on Westlaw
at 2009 WL 45972).
184 Id.
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legislative and executive politics.185 And the most remarkable
brief in the case, that of the Conference of Chief Justices,1 8 6 asserted, from a perspective on the front lines of rising campaign
expenditures, that "the Constitution may require the disqualification of a judge in a particular matter because of extraordinarily out-of-line campaign support from a source that has a substantial stake in the proceedings"187 and further that, "[b]ecause the
applicability of the Due Process Clause in the campaign spending
context depends on the particular facts of each case, no brightline rule can or should be attempted." 8 8
Given the striking similarity of those statements from the
state chief justices to Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court,
Justice Kennedy's opinion is paradoxically both a landmark and
a properly narrow model of restraint and deference to the state
court judges-albeit not to one rogue within their ranks.
Finally, the postscript to the seven incremental refinements
in Justice Kennedy's thinking about judicial elections is Citizens
United v FederalElections Commission.'8 9 Less than one year
removed from the decision in Caperton, the Court, with Justice
Kennedy once again writing for a 5-4 majority, issued its blockbuster opinion in Citizens United, in which the Court, inter alia,
overturned century-old limits on corporate general treasury fund
expenditures to influence candidate elections.o9 0 A fulsome discussion of Citizens United is beyond the scope of this Article, as
is a searching examination of the relationship between Citizens
9 1 Within the context of considering JusUnited and Caperton.1
185 See, for example, Paul J. Nyden, MiningAppeal Moving Along,Charleston Gazette
(W Va) 1A (May 16, 2008) (noting Olson's statement that "[t]he improper appearance
created by money in judicial elections is one of the most important issues facing our judicial system today.... A line needs to be drawn somewhere to prevent a judge from hearing cases involving a person who has made massive campaign contributions to benefit the
judge").
186 Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party, Caperton v A. T Massey Coal Co, Civil Action No 08-22 (2009) (available on
Westlaw at 2009 WL 45973) ("CCJ Brief" hereinafter). A more substantial treatment of
the influence of the truly remarkable CCJ Brief is beyond the scope of this article. The
CCJ Brief is covered in greater depth in Sample, 60 Syracuse L Rev at 296 (cited in note
160).
187 CCJ Brief at *4 (cited in note 186).
188 Id at *22.
189 130 S Ct 876.
190 See id at 917.

191 In Democracy at the Corner ofFirst and Fourteenth:Judicial Campaign Spending
and Equality, in which I examine the Court's older and more recent campaign-finance
jurisprudence through the combined lenses of Caperton and Citizens United, I coin the
concept of "Capertoncontributions" to describe the equation, in Caperton,of independent
expenditures with contributions in the judicial elections context. Sample, 66 NYU Ann
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tice Kennedy's thinking on judicial elections, however, Citizens
United not only does not undermine the appropriateness of differential treatment of judicial elections, but underscores Justice
Kennedy's acute sensitivity to the need for such treatment.
The fact that Justice Kennedy's Citizens United opinion was
joined by his ideological adversaries in Caperton illustrates that
his sense of the influence of money on the judiciary is sui generis. 19 2 Meanwhile, Justice Stevens's view-that, "[alt a time
when concerns about the conduct of judicial elections have
reached a fever pitch, the Court today unleashes the floodgates of
corporate and union general treasury spending in these races"19 3-iS shared by, among others, Justice O'Connor. Justice
O'Connor told an audience at the Georgetown University Law
Center that, "[iln invalidating some of the existing checks on
campaign spending, the majority in Citizens Unitedhas signaled
that the problem of campaign contributions in judicial elections
might get considerably worse and quite soon.... I think mutually assured destruction is the most likely outcome." 194 Whatever
one's perspective as to the reasoning in Citizens United,195 that
Justice Kennedy writes both opinions ultimately turns on one
principle more than any other: judicial elections are different. In
that sense, Justice Ginsburg may have lost the day in White, and
Justice O'Connor may have come to regret her vote, but ultimately, in Caperton,it is Justice O'Connor's regret, and Justice Ginsburg's rejection of the "unilocular, 'an election is an election'"19 6
interpretation of White that wins the decade. Justice Kennedy's

Surv Am L 2011 at 47 (forthcoming 2011) (cited in note 160). I argue, moreover, that
Justice Kennedy's "sub silentio treatment of independent expenditures as contributions is
a refreshing rejection of formalism in a circumstance where, if the rigid [contributionfexpenditure] distinction had been controlling, the focus of analysis would have been
$1,000 in campaign contributions as opposed to $3 million in expenditure support." Id at
5. For an excellent treatment of the two cases, see Hasen, 109 Mich L Rev at 584 (forthcoming 2011) (cited in note 167) (asserting that "the Court's new doctrine is already incoherent. The Citizens United majority did not satisfactorily explain how independent
expenditures-which apparently cannot corrupt-were so corruptive, apparently corruptive, or distorting of a judicial election . .. that the Court mandated [Benjamin's] recusal
[in Caperton]").
192 See Part II.C.
193 Citizens United,130 S Ct at 968 (Stevens dissenting) (citations omitted).
194 Adam Liptak, Former Justice O'Connor Sees ll in Election Finance Ruling, NY
Times A16 (Jan 27, 2010).
195 My own views are much more in line with those of the dissenters (whose reasoning
on the same questions commanded a majority just seven years earlier in McConnell v
FEC, 540 US 93 (2003)).
196 White, 536 US at 805 (Ginsburg dissenting).
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incremental path to differentiating judicial elections is the basis
of that victory.
III. JUDGE EASTERBROOK: "RECUSAL CLAUSE DOES NOT PRESENT
A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE AT ALL"
A. Caperton'sImpact on the Canons
For all of the appropriate focus on Caperton from a constitutional perspective, it is my contention that "the decision's greatest impact will be not as dispositive precedent in itself, but in
spurring greater vigilance in recusal, both systemically and
among individual jurists."197 One commentator asserts that the
"second legacy point of the opinion" is that "Caperton supercharged-both legitimized and green-lighted-disqualification
based on canons of judicial ethics." 198
In a reprise of Kennedy's statement in White-and now
speaking for the Court-the majority in Caperton noted that
"[s]tates may choose to adopt recusal standards more rigorous
than due process requires." 9 9 Further, the Court noted with approval the Conference of Chief Justices' statement that the canons of judicial conduct are the "'principal safeguard against judicial campaign abuses' that threaten to imperil 'public confidence
in the fairness and integrity of the nation's elected judges.'" 200 To
quote both the applicable canon in West Virginia and its mirrored language in the ABA Model Rule and in 28 USC § 455(a) is
to require disqualification whenever the judge's "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned."20 1

197 Sample, 60 Syracuse L Rev at 293-94 (cited in note 160). During a late revision of
this Article, proposed changes to Part 151 of the New York State Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts were announced on February 14, 2011. See ProposedPart 151
of the Rules of the ChiefAdministratorof the Courts,online at httpf/www.nylj.conVnylaw
yer/adgifs/decisions/021511rule.pdf (visited Sept 9, 2011). The new rules, inter alia, disqualify a judge from hearing a case by an attorney or litigant who contributed $2,500 or
more individually or $3,500 or more collectively to a judge's campaign. This striking shift
demonstrates an interest in increasing judicial integrity; however, that the rules exempt
expenditures from limitation illuminates the campaign-expenditure dichotomy revealed
in Buckley v Valeo and further indicates the need for more stringent recusal guidelines.
424 US 1 (1976). See Joel Stashenko and Noeleen G. Walder, Recusal Is Step in Right
Direction, BarLeaders Say, NY L J (Feb 15, 2011), online at httpi/ httpV/www.law.conv
jsp/nylyPubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202481963973&sreturn=1&hbxlogin=1
(visited Sept 6,
2011).
19 Swisher, 52 Ariz L Rev at 348 (cited in note 159).
199 Caperton,129 S Ct at 2267 (internal quotation omitted).
200 Id at 2266, quoting CCJ Brief at *4, *11 (cited in note 186).
201 Caperton,129 S Ct at 2266.
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According to the Court, the "codes of conduct serve to maintain the integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law." 202 Prior to
White, such a statement would not have been newsworthy in the
slightest, 203 but in the post- White "disarray" described in Part I,
contrary claims were able to flourish. 204 Accordingly, the "judicial
seal of approval from the nation's highest court is a big deal,"
even though, "in the main, the Court just repeated the laws
(Codes) that had been on the books for many, many years." 205

B. Bauer vShepard
The Seventh Circuit's 2010 decision, Bauer v Shepard 206
provides a model of analysis for judicial campaign restrictions in
the post-Caperton era. It also serves to marry the various
strands of this Article, ranging from Lawyer Ketchum to White
to Caperton.Earlier in 2010, the Circuit had held that Wisconsin
rules forbidding judges to be members of political parties were
unconstitutional, but that "rules restricting partisan activities
(such as endorsing a candidate for non-judicial office), and personal solicitation of funds, [were] valid." 207 In Bauer,the Seventh
Circuit addressed a challenge to Indiana's Code of Judicial Conduct, the genesis of which was an Indiana Right to Life ("IRL")
questionnaire for judicial candidates similar to those described in
Part II.A.2. 208
IRL distributed questionnaires to candidates for Indiana judicial office, with nine questions asking recipients whether they
subscribe to propositions such as: "I believe that the unborn child
is biologically human and alive and that the right to life of human beings should be respected at every stage of their biological
development." 209 The questionnaire included options for candi202 Id. Note, in this regard, that Justice Kennedy once again, as he foreshadowed in
Lopez Torresand fhite, speaks to both distinct interests rather than conflating them.
203 Briffault, 153 U Pa L Rev at 198 (cited in note 60), quoting Randall T. Shepard,
Campaign Speech: Restraintand Liberty in JudicialEthics,9 Georgetown J Legal Ethics
1059, 1067 (1996) (explaining that "[a]s Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard of Indiana has
argued, the duty of judicial impartiality and the rules protecting it 'have their foundations in due process'").
204 See, for example, Briffault, 153 U Pa L Rev at 182 (cited in note 60) (asserting that
in White "[t]he Court cast doubt on the primary rationale for the campaign canonspreserving the impartiality and the appearance of impartiality of the state judiciary").
205 Swisher, 52 Ariz L Rev at 349 (cited in note 159).
206 620 F3d 704 (7th Cir 2010).
207 Id at 706, citing Siefert vAlexander, 608 F3d 974 (7th Cir 2010).
208 See Bauer,620 F3d at 706-07.
209 Id.
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dates to indicate one of the following responses to each of the
above propositions: "agree," "disagree," "undecided," "decline," or
"refuse to answer." 210 The plaintiffs, who were candidates recruited by IRL, 211 with James Bopp serving as counsel (see Part
II.A.1.b), challenged four provisions of Indiana's Code.
The first challenged provision, the "commits clauses," "forbid
judges and candidates . . . to make commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of judicial office." 2 12 The
second, the "recusal clause," consisted of Indiana's codification of
the near-universal recusal provision discussed in Part II.A.1.b,
requiring recusal whenever a judge's impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." 213 In the words of the Seventh Circuit, the
"[p]laintiffs direct[ed] special fire at subsection 2.11(A)(5), which
requires recusal if the judge 'has made a public statement . . .
that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.'" 214 The plaintiffs also challenged Indiana's "partisanactivities clauses" 2 15 and "solicitation clauses" that restrict the
fundraising activities of judicial candidates. 216
210 Bauer v Shepard, 634 F Supp 2d 912, 922 (ND Ind 2009). The "decline" option
included an asterisk indicating:
By declining to answer, I assert that I would have replied to this question but
for the prospect that I may be disciplined for doing so under Indiana Judicial
Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) and (ii)-which provides that a judicial candidate "shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; [or] (ii) make statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies
or issues that are likely to come before the court." I also will not answer because
doing so could subject me to mandatory recusal as a judge under Canon 3E(1),
which requires "[a] judge [to] disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." My response
would neither cause me to be biased for or against parties nor affect my ability
to be open-minded with regard to any issue. Id. Picking up on the White taxonomy, Indiana's collective "commits clauses" define the term "impartiality" as
"absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes
of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind considering the issues that
may come before a judge." Bauer,620 F3d at 713.
211 Bauer,620 F3d at 707 (noting that, after an initial dismissal due to lack of standing, Indiana Right to Life "then recruited a candidate for judicial office (Torrey Bauer)
and a sitting judge (David Certo) as plaintiffs to join it in this new suit" and that "both
say that they refrain from speaking about abortion, and other controversial topics, because they fear the prospect of sanctions under the Code").
212 Id. See also Ind Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.10(B) (2010); Ind Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4.1(A)(13) (2010).
213 Bauer, 620 F3d at 707. See also Ind Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2.11(A)
(2010).
214 Bauer,620 F3d at 707.
215 Id. See Ind Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 4.1(A)(1) (2010); Ind Code of Judicial
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Relying on the Circuit's decision in Siefert, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, quickly disposed of the challenges to
the solicitation 217 and partisan-activities clauses, 2 18 noting, in the
case of the latter, that like Hatch Act restrictions on the political
activities of government employees, "rules that keep judges out
of active politics" are aimed at the "preservation of public confidence." 2 19 While these holdings are entirely consistent with the
broader premise that, notwithstanding White, judicial elections
are different in constitutionally salient respects, for purposes of
this Article, Bauer's analysis of Indiana's "commits" and
"recusal" clauses is of greater importance and offers a model approach for post- Caperton analysis of the canons of judicial conduct.
Bauer begins by recognizing that "[s]ome, perhaps many, of
the state's judges and judicial candidates may be using the commits clauses as a pretext to keep out of a political minefield." 220
Bauer notes, however, that none of the questions requires a
"commitment" or "promise" on any issue in the sense that a judicial candidate who answers "agree" in response to the proposition
set forth above regarding the "unborn child" has "not committed
to defying Roe v. Wade and its sequels." 22 1 Bauerrecognizes that
White "holds that judges and judicial candidates are entitled to
announce their views on legal and political subjects." 222 With
that recognition, Bauer notes that "judges and judicial candidates have views on issues such as those the questionnaire poses,
and are entitled to have them."223 To this point in the analysis,
one might be uncertain as to whether, given the emphasis, Judge
Conduct Canon 4. 1(A)(2) (2010).
216 Bauer,620 F3d at 707.
217 Id at 709-10. Note that the Sixth and Eighth Circuits reached contrary results in
Carey v Wolitzek, 614 F3d 189, 206 (6th Cir 2010) (concluding that Kentucky's solicitation clause was unconstitutionally overbroad) and Wersal v Sexton, 613 F3d 821, 842 (8th
Cir 2010) (striking down Minnesota's no-[political] endorsement rule and solicitation
limits). Judge Easterbrook, recognizing these decisions, noted in particular that the
Eighth Circuit panel in Wersal concluded that it was bound by that circuit's decision on
remand in White to apply "strict scrutiny to all ethical rules that affect either judicial
campaigns or judges' participation in campaigns for other offices," but Judge Easterbrook
noted, "[wle are unpersuaded and shall stick with Sieferts analysis, which differentiates
what judges can do in their own campaigns . . . from how judges can participate in other
persons' campaigns." Bauer, 620 F3d at 713.
218 Bauer,620 F3d at 711-13.
219 Id at 712.
220 Id at 713-14.
221 Id at 714.

222 Bauer,620 F3d at 714, citing White, 536 US at 788.
223 Bauer,620 F3d at 714.
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Easterbrook finds the provisions constitutional. The answer is
not only affirmative, but emphatically so: "Although the Court
held in White [ ] that judges may state their views on contestable
and controversial subjects-such as whether the exclusionary
rule is wise policy, or whether mandatory minimum sentences
should be repealed-it did not hold that judges may make commitments or promises about behavior in office."224 Perhaps most

effectively, Bauertakes this principle beyond the abstract with a
series of hypothetical scenarios. In the context of this article, it
may be instructive to keep Justice Ketchum in the back of one's
mind as one reads the italics following each of the examples offered by Judge Easterbrook:
Imagine a judge or judicial candidate who said: "I will issue a search warrant every time the police ask me to."
That speaker is promising to defy the judicial oath of of-

fice. Or imagine the statement: "I will always rule in favor
of the litigant whose income is lower, so that wealth can
be redistributed according to the principles of communism." (More plausibly, a candidate might say that he
will award damages against drug companies, whether or
not the drug has been negligently designed or tested, because they charge "too much" for their products.) Again
thatperson is promising to disobey the law and disregard

the litigants' entitlements. Nothing in White [ ] deals with
statements of this flavor, or any otherpromise to act on

the bench as a partisan of a political agenda. 225

The critical distinction recognized by the Seventh Circuit,
and either misunderstood or-less charitably-ignored by individual candidates and jurists akin to Justice Ketchum and Justice Parker 226 and by the interest groups with whom they act in
tandem, is that a "judge who promises to ignore the facts and the
law to pursue his (or his constituents') ideas about wise policy is
problematic in a way that a judge who has announced considered
views on legal subjects is not. The commits clauses condemn the

224 Id at 715 (emphasis added). See also Stephen Gillers, "If Elected, I Promise
Should JudicialCandidatesBe Allowed to Say?, 35 Ind L Rev 725, 725
["-What
(2002) (noting that "[w]e have assumed the popular election of judges and we must now
find the right balance between voter information and the values of the judicial process
and therefore due process").
225 Bauer,620 F3d at 715 (emphasis added).
226 See Part I.
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former and allow the latter."227 Inevitably, a perfectionist will be
less than satisfied by the imprecision of the distinction, but as
Bauerrecognizes, "[i]t is not as if Indiana could make everything
clear by changing a few words. The main source of ambiguity in
the commits clauses is the protean word 'impartial.' It has been
around for a long time and has resisted precise definition." 228
It is at this juncture of Bauer that the decision begins to
marry the canon-based strands discussed in this Article-that
have, as Indiana Chief Justice Randall Shepard notes, 22 9 due
process at their foundation-to Caperton's treatment of due process itself. "It is easy to say that a judge who has a financial
stake in the outcome is not impartial. But how about a judge who
receives a campaign contribution from one side? A big campaign
contribution? A whopping campaign contribution?" 230
In a sense, Judge Easterbrook is pointing out, via three different levels of "contributions"-"a" contribution, a "big" contribution, and a "whopping" contribution-that the protection of
the state interest in impartiality involves data points on a spectrum, with correspondingly different levels of protection being
appropriate. All of which echoes Justice Kennedy's original "more
rigorous than due process requires" statement in his White concurrence. 23 1 A state may choose, for example, to require, by rule,
recusal 232 in circumstances involving a "big" but not "whopping"
227 Bauer, 620 F3d at 715-16. With respect to the plaintiffs' allegation that the canons
are, like the announce clause in White, overbroad, Bauer recognizes the possibility that
Indiana might, in a future case, read the commits clauses so broadly as to sweep in protected speech, noting that "there is an irreducible risk that a promise may be misunderstood-or that the Commission and the Supreme Court of Indiana may treat as 'inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office' even
the sort of statements that are squarely protected by White," but Bauer maintains that
the "best way to find out is to wait and see." Id at 716.
228 Id at 717.

229 See quotation of Chief Justice Shepard at note 203 and accompanying text.
230 Bauer,620 F3d at 717, citing Caperton,129 S Ct 2252 ("$3 million from one donor,
more than all other contributions combined"). Notably, Judge Easterbrook's description of
the "whopping campaign contribution"is, like Justice Kennedy's use of the term 'contribution' in Caperton,technically incorrect in the sense that the $3 million in support from
Massey CEO Blankenship came in the form of independent expenditures. See Caperton,
129 S Ct at 2257 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, as I argue in Democracyat the Corner
of First and Fourteenth,Justice Kennedy's conflation of the terms in Caperton is clearly
intentional, and, from a de facto if not de jure perspective, "the case for regulating not
only contributions, but expenditures, in judicial campaigns is not only compelling, but
urgently necessary to prevent a developing constitutional crisis." Sample, 66 NYU Ann
Surv Am L 2011 at 778 (forthcoming 2011) (cited in note 159).
231 White, 536 US at 794. See also notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
232 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Caperton expressly notes that, "[ilndeed,
some States require recusal based on campaign contributions similar to those in this case.
See, e.g., Ala Code §§ 12-24-1, 12-24-2 (2006); Miss Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3E(2)
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campaign expenditure, where a Caperton-based due process
analysis would not constitutionallyrequire it.
Pivoting, Judge Easterbrook in Bauer observes that the
court's commits clause analysis "implies the validity of the
recusal clause. States have a strong interest in ensuring that
judges come to their cases without precommitments.... But
there is more to be said. The recusal clause does not present a
constitutionalissue at all."233 A stronger post-Capertonaffirmation of the relationship between Caperton's validity as a constitutional floor and the State's prerogative to protect its "vital interest" in maintaining the actual and perceived integrity of its judiciary is not to be found.
Noting that "a state may decide to assign each case to a
judge whose impartiality is not in question," Baueracknowledges
that "all [the recusal rule] does is allocate cases among judges,
just as 28 U.S.C. § 455 [the general federal disqualification provision] does.

. .

. States are entitled to protect litigants by assign-

ing impartial judges before the fact, as well as by removing partial judges afterward."234 And speaking to the overstated notion
that, because a state has chosen elections as its means of judicial
selection, the remedy for bias is political rather than legal, Judge
Easterbrook properly notes that "[i]t is small comfort for a litigant who takes her case to state court to know that, while her
trial was unfair, the judge would eventually lose an election." 235
IV. CONCLUSION

Roy Schotland notes that, "'[black in 1906, Roscoe Pound, a
scholar at Harvard Law School, started a campaign to have judges appointed . . . . When he spoke, eight in ten American judges
stood for election. Today, the figure is 87 percent.'" 236 It is abundantly clear today not only that judicial elections are not going
away, but that the tensions between First Amendment and due
process interests are greater than ever. More than a century removed from Pound's remarks, in the last decade the United
States Supreme Court issued three decisions reflecting in particular the incremental refinements in the thinking of Justice An(2008)." Caperton, 129 S Ct at 2266.
233 Bauer 620 F3d at 718 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
234 Id.
235 Id, quoting Bauer vShepard, 634 F Supp 2d at 922 (alteration in original).
236 Schotland, 74 Mo L Rev at 510 n 7 (cited in note 78), citing The Election ofJudges:

Guilty, Your Honour., The Economist 28-29 (July 24, 2004).
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thony Kennedy. These three decisions offer guidance for America's next century of judicial elections. The climax of that incremental process is the landmark decision in Caperton. As one

scholar puts it, "[p]ost-Caperton,the world has changed."2 3 7
Jurists navigating that changed world would be hard
pressed to find better, more concise guidance as to their role-a
role of prestige; a role of choice-as fiduciaries of the rule of law
than the following sentence from Judge Easterbrook's decision in
Bauer. In the course of his decision affirming the validity and
value of the canons of judicial conduct Judge Easterbrook writes:
"The recusal clause applies to a judge in his role as public employee, not his role as candidate." 238 The preceding is a sentence
that both Lawyer and Jurist Ketchum-and others like himought to read very carefully.

237
238

Swisher, 52 Ariz L Rev at 349 (cited in note 159).
Bauer,620 F3d at 718.
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